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WRONGFUL BIRTH AND WRONGFUL LIFE
ACTIONS ARISING FROM NEGLIGENT
GENETIC COUNSELING: THE NEED
FOR LEGISLATION SUPPORTING
REPRODUCTIVE CHOICE
I. Introduction
Genetic research has made great strides in discovering the origins
of genetic birth defects,' and has developed new tests that can accu-
rately diagnose many birth defects in utero.2 This kind of prenatal
testing and diagnosis, also called genetic screening3 or genetic coun-
seling,4 is being used by growing numbers of couples in family
planning.'
Genetic counseling may take place either before the woman decides
to conceive6 or during the early stages of pregnancy.7 If genetic coun-
1. See Zuskar, The Psychological Impact of Prenatal Diagnosis of Fetal Abnormality."
Strategies for Investigation and Intervention, 12 WOMEN & HEALTH 91, 92 (1987) [here-
inafter Zuskar]; see also infra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
2. "A number of newer techniques using fetoscopy, alpha-fetoprotein, and ultra-
sound have recently been added to the physician's armamentarium of prenatal diagnostic
procedures." Id.; see also infra notes 38-41 and accompanying text.
3. See, e.g., Steele, Genetic Screening and the Public Well-Being, in MEDICAL ETH-
ICS AND THE LAW: IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC POLICY 345 (M. Hiller ed. 1981) [here-
inafter Steele].
The goals of genetic screening .. can be divided into three parts. Genetic
screening can attempt to identify newborns or older individuals who may be
affected with genetic disease.... Genetic screening attempts to identify fetuses
effected [sic] with genetic diseases prior to birth .... Finally, genetic screening
can attempt to identify individuals who are prospectively at greater risk than
the general population of having offspring with specific genetic defects.
Id. at 345-46.
4. See, e.g., Fraser, Introduction: The Development of Genetic Counseling, in GE-
NETIC COUNSELING: FACTS, VALUES, AND NORMS 5-15 (A. Capron, M. LappE, R.
Murray, T. Powledge, S. Twiss, & D. Bergsma ed. 1979); Capron, Tort Liability in Ge-
netic Counseling, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 618, 619 (1979) [hereinafter Capron]; Note, Father
and Mother Know Best. Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Coun-
seling, 87 YALE L.J. 1488, 1490 (1978); see also infra note 47 and accompanying text.
5. See D. KEVLES, IN THE NAME OF EUGENICS: GENETICS AND THE USES OF
HUMAN HEREDITY 257 (1985) [hereinafter KEVLES]; see also infra notes 32-41 and ac-
companying text.
6. See Lewis, Better Babies, HEALTH, Mar. 1987, at 24 ("[i]deally, counseling begins
before pregnancy occurs, as soon as a woman decides she wants to have children. The
counselor may sketch a family chart (called a pedigree) to help assess the risk of a specific
disorder and to suggest that certain diagnostic tests be conducted") [hereinafter Lewis].
7. See Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 638 F. Supp. 979, 982 (M.D.N.C. 1986) (construing
North Carolina law), aff'd in part, vacated in part, 852 F.2d 773 (4th Cir. 1988). In that
case, Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher's first child suffered from severe multiple birth defects. 638
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seling conducted before conception discloses the existence of a defec-
tive genetic trait, the couple may decide not to have children.' If the
woman is already pregnant and her physician diagnoses a genetic dis-
ease in the fetus, the parents may then elect to terminate the preg-
nancy. 9 Family planning decisions are extremely personal and
F. Supp. at 980. Before conceiving a second child, the Gallaghers sought genetic counsel-
ing. Id. The court distinguished pre-conception genetic counseling from post-conception
genetic counseling as follows:
The first [type] is pre-conception genetic counseling. This type of counseling
provides patients with information pertaining to whether they could or should
conceive. Typically, such information relates to fertility and to the relative po-
tential for conceiving a child with genetic or congenital defects .... Post-con-
ception genetic counseling usually relates to tests conducted while the child is in
utero, to determine if the fetus suffers from genetic defects.
Id. at 981-82 (citation omitted). A chromosome analysis performed on the Gallagher's
first child showed no genetic abnormality. Id. at 980. The Gallaghers therefore went
ahead and had a second child, who suffered from the same multiple birth defects as the
first child. Id. The district court held that wrongful birth actions exist in North Carolina
where "a health care provider negligently provides counseling and information which
induces a couple to conceive a defective child." Id. at 982. The court also held that the
child had no cause of action for wrongful life because the physician provided genetic
counseling before the child was conceived and thus had no duty to her. Id. at 982-83.
Most of the litigation concerning negligent genetic counseling and the subsequent birth
of an infant with genetic birth defects involves procedures performed, or omitted, during
the early stages of pregnancy. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d
230, 231, 512 N.E.2d 691, 693 (1987) (woman with family history of hemophilia sought
genetic counseling during first trimester of pregnancy, parents recovered extraordinary
medical and educational expenses associated with the disease); Alquijay v. St. Luke's-
Roosevelt Hosp. Center, 63 N.Y.2d 978, 473 N.E.2d 244, 483 N.Y.S.2d 994 (1984) (erro-
neous amniocentesis result indicated mother would give birth to healthy child; child was
born with Down's syndrome. Infant's cause of action for wrongful life not legally cogni-
zable in N.Y.; parents' cause of action barred by statute of limitations); Howard v.
Lecher, 42 N.Y.2d 109, 366 N.E.2d 64, 397 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1977) (despite parents' ances-
try which put them in high-risk group for child born with Tay-Sachs disease, defendant
doctor did not administer available blood tests or take a genealogical history; infant was
subsequently born with Tay-Sachs disease. Parents sought damages only for emotional
distress; recovery denied); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985)
(parents of child afflicted with Down's syndrome claimed they were not properly advised
of availability of amniocentesis and genetic counseling; court held neither parents nor
infant had valid cause of action), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 835 (1986). The principles, how-
ever, are equally applicable to pre-conception negligence.
8. See Steele, supra note 3, at 350. "After genetic counseling, about 33 percent of
the couples at relatively high risk (i.e., greater than 10 percent) of having a genetically
defective child elect to continue to reproduce; about 25 percent of the couples at relatively
low risk (i.e., less than 5 percent) elect not to reproduce." Id.
9. Id. at 346; see also Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979)
("[p]ublic policy now supports, rather than militates against, the proposition that [a wo-
man] not be impermissibly denied a meaningful opportunity to make that decision").
This decision is an element of the parents' claim in a wrongful birth action. See infra
notes 14, 52-53, 148-56 and accompanying text.
Wrongful birth and wrongful life actions would not be possible if a woman's right to
have an abortion were not constitutionally protected, as established in Roe v. Wade, 410
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depend in large part upon an individual's religious and moral beliefs,
as well as social and emotional reactions.10 The ramifications of an
erroneous diagnosis, or the failure to diagnose a defect altogether, can
be devastating for a family.'1 The result-i.e., the birth of a child
with genetic birth defects-may have enormous financial, emotional
and social implications for the child, parents and siblings.' 2
U.S. 113 (1973). Roe, however, was recently reconsidered in Webster v. Reproductive
Health Services, 57 U.S.L.W. 5023 (1989). Although Webster rejects Roe's trimester
analysis, it does not overrule the constitutional right to have an abortion.
The Court, however, has decided to hear three more abortion cases in its next term.
Turnock v. Ragsdale, 841 F.2d 1358 (7th Cir. 1988),juris. postponed, [Current Transfer
Binder] S. Ct. Bull. (CCH) B4467 (July 3, 1989); Ohio v. Akron Center for Reproductive
Health, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988), prob. juris noted, [Current Transfer Binder] S. Ct.
Bull. (CCH) B4467 (July 3, 1989); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 853 F.2d 1452 (8th Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, [Current Transfer Binder] S. Ct. Bull. (CCH) B4468 (July 3, 1989). Even if
the Court ultimately overrules Roe, abortion will not be automatically criminalized;
rather, the decision to prohibit abortions will be left to each state. See Webster, 530
U.S.L.W. at 5030-31. Furthermore, because many countries besides the United States
guarantee the right to have an abortion, the Supreme Court's future decisions will not
affect the vitality of this Note.
10. See Berman, 80 N.J. at 440, 404 A.2d at 18 (Handler, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part) ("[p]ersons, confronted with the awesome decision of whether or not
to allow the birth of a defective child, face a moral dilemma of enormous consequence");
see also infra notes 156-59, 163, 181 and accompanying text.
11. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 359-63, 478 A.2d 755, 766-68 (1984)
(Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (discussing the likelihood of parents'
shock, stress and emotional trauma at birth of handicapped child after genetic counselor
had negligently advised that fetus was normal); Asch, Reproductive Technology and Disa-
bility, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s: A BRIEFING HANDBOOK 59, 68 (N.
Taub & S. Cohen 1988) ("[f]or most nondisabled people, giving birth to a child with an
impairment is rarely welcomed .... [T]he immediate question raised is how much the
child with a disability will burden the woman, her mate if she has one, siblings, relatives
and society as a whole.... The lack of a natural communal or familial structure can be
psychologically and socially devastating"); see also infra notes 156-59, 163, 181 and ac-
companying text.
12. The case of Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 290 S.E.2d 825 (1982), illustrates the
potential harm that may result from negligent genetic counseling. The plaintiffs, Mr. and
Mrs. Burger, being of eastern European ancestry, sought testing for Tay-Sachs disease
when Mrs. Burger was three and one-half months pregnant with her first child. Id. at
410, 290 S.E.2d at 827. Tay-Sachs is an invariably fatal disease of the brain and spinal
cord that occurs in Jewish infants of eastern European ancestry. Id. At four to six
months of age the infant's central nervous system begins to degenerate, resulting in blind-
ness, deafness, paralysis, seizures and mental retardation, and a life expectancy of no
more than four years. Id. Because both parents must carry the Tay-Sachs genetic trait in
order to afflict the child, Mr. Burger underwent a blood test; because it revealed he was
not a Tay-Sachs carrier, Mrs. Burger continued her pregnancy and gave birth to a daugh-
ter. Id. When the child was four months old, their physician informed the Burgers that
the child had Tay-Sachs disease. Id. At trial an expert witness testified that Mr. Burger's
blood had been incorrectly labeled by the defendant hospital. Id. at 411, 290 S.E.2d at
827. Tay-Sachs disease is more debilitating than many other types of birth defects, as
attested to by a reporter's interview of another couple with a Tay-Sachs child:
'We were just devastated,' David Astor said. 'You think you have a healthy
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Negligent genetic counseling has led to the emergence of "wrongful
birth" and "wrongful life" suits.' 3 Wrongful birth is the parents'
cause of action against a medical practitioner alleging that his negli-
gence deprived them of making an informed decision regarding their
constitutionally-protected procreative rights, ultimately resulting in
the birth of a child with birth defects. 4 Wrongful life is the infant's
cause of action which is based on the premise that but for the medical
practitioner's negligent act or omission, the infant would never have
been born.' 5 The terms "wrongful birth" and "wrongful life" are con-
baby one day and the next you are told your baby has a 100[%] chance of
dying. There is no hope.' . . . Helplessly, they watch Abigail's decline. 'She
progressively lost her sight,' David Astor said. 'She's 95 percent paralyzed.
She has lost the ability to swallow, so we feed her by tube now. She can't roll
over. She can't cry.' . . . The experience is a drain on their emotions.... The
couple are undergoing therapy to hold their marriage together and to help them
cope with 'the grief, the anguish and the fact that we're going to have to lose
our daughter, that this could have been prevented,' Kathy Astor said. It has
also affected their finances and Kathy Astor's career. The Astors have had to
provide nurses full-time to care for Abigail. And because of the strain, Kathy
Astor had to take less stressful work.
Faulty Genetic Test Leaves Couple With a Dying Baby, N.Y. Newsday, Jan. 11, 1988, at
25, cols. 2-3.
13. The two terms, as they have been developed in the common law, are not inter-
changeable. See infra notes 14-15 and accompanying text. The two causes of action are,
however, interdependent. See infra notes 76-83 and accompanying text.
14. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (first federal case to recognize a cause of action for wrongful birth, applying
Pennsylvania law). See generally Comment, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth Causes of
Action-Suggestions for a Consistent Analysis, 63 MARQUETrE L. REV. 611, 621-23
(1980) (providing further discussion of the term).
15. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 364, 478 A.2d 755, 769 (1984) (Handler,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[the infant's] injury consists of the conse-
quences of the deprivation of his parents' right to determine on his behalf whether he
should have been born"); see also Note, Wrongful Life: Exploring the Development of a
New Tort, 21 NEW ENG. L. REV. 635, 636 (1986).
Wrongful birth and wrongful life must be further distinguished from "wrongful con-
ception," also known as "wrongful pregnancy." These actions involve negligently per-
formed sterilization procedures, usually resulting in the birth of a normal, healthy child.
See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 983
(1983) (birth of healthy child occurred after failed tubal cauterization); O'Toole v. Green-
berg, 64 N.Y.2d 427, 477 N.E.2d 445, 488 N.Y.S.2d 143 (1985) (birth of healthy child
occurred after failed tubal ligation); Speck v. Finegold, 497 Pa. 77, 439 A.2d 110 (1981)
(birth of genetically defective child occurred after negligent vasectomy and abortion pro-
cedures). These types of cases are outside the scope of this Note because they involve
different policy considerations.
Another situation arising from negligent genetic counseling which will not be explored
in this Note is one in which a physician informs a woman that her fetus has birth defects,
when in fact it does not. See, e.g., Lynch v. Bay Ridge Obstetrical & Gynecological
Assoc., P.C., 72 N.Y.2d 632, 532 N.E.2d 1239, 536 N.Y.S.2d 11 (1988) (woman who
chose to have abortion because of erroneous medical advice given to her was held to have
valid cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress); Martinez v. Long Is-
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fusing because they seem to indicate a unique or novel claim for relief,
when they are merely tort claims sounding in traditional negligence or
medical malpractice.' 6 " 'Wrongful birth' is a misnomer that does not
land Jewish Hillside Medical Center, 70 N.Y.2d 697, 512 N.E.2d 538, 518 N.Y.S.2d 955
(1987) (after physician diagnosed severe fetal congenital birth defects, plaintiff terminated
her pregnancy although she felt it was morally wrong; plaintiff later recovered for emo-
tional distress after learning fetus had been healthy).
Due to the wide variety of factual circumstances that may arise in connection with
prenatal diagnoses, there has been widespread confusion among the courts attempting to
define and distinguish wrongful birth and wrongful life. "[Tlhe difficulties presented by
this categorization process have been compounded by haphazard use of the available ter-
minology, both in the cases and the commentary, that fails adequately to distinguish
factually and legally dissimilar claims." Rogers, Wrongful Life and Wrongful Birth:
Medical Malpractice in Genetic Counseling and Prenatal Testing, 33 S.C.L. REV. 713, 715
(1982) [hereinafter Rogers].
A prime example of the confusion in terminology is New York's leading case, Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Mrs. Becker was
37 years old when she became pregnant and subsequently gave birth to a Down's syn-
drome child. Id. at 405-06, 386 N.E.2d at 808, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 896. The Beckers alleged
they were never advised that women over 35 are at a higher risk of having a Down's
syndrome child and were also not advised as to the availability of amniocentesis. Id. at
406, 386 N.E.2d at 810, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 898. The court held that the infant had no cause
of action for wrongful life. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902. The
parents did establish a valid cause of action, although the court did not call it wrongful
birth. Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901. The court also concluded that
wrongful birth applied only to illegitimate children. Id. at 409-10, 386 N.E.2d at 811,
413 N.Y.S.2d at 899. While these interpretations are not generally accepted today,
Becker v. Schwartz is still precedent in New York and is often cited by sister states ad-
dressing these issues for the first time. See infra notes 113-15 and accompanying text; cf
Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1204 n.2 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) ("[t]he use of the
terms 'wrongful life' and 'wrongful birth' more often serves to obscure the issues than to
elucidate them; unfortunately the labels are so entrenched in normal usage that it is diffi-
cult to entirely abstain from their use").
One commentator has recommended the substitution of the terms "wrongful impair-
ment" and "wrongful formation." Collins, An Overview and Analysis: Prenatal Torts,
Preconception Torts, Wrongful Life, Wrongful Death, and Wrongful Birth: Time for a
New Framework, 22 J. FAM. L. 677, 678 (1984). "A child, who is born alive, may have a
wrongful impairment cause of action if it suffers from impairments which are the result of
wrongful postconception or preconception conduct of, generally, one other than its par-
ents." Id. at 678 n.3. "Parents may have a wrongful formation cause of action if their
procreative rights have been denied by the wrongful conduct of another." Id. at 678 n.4.
Although such refinement of terms would probably be useful if only to minimize the
apparent contradiction of a term such as "wrongful life," the courts have only recently
come to accept uniform meanings for wrongful birth and wrongful life. These terms
currently indicate the parents' cause of action and the infant's cause of action, respec-
tively. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 225 n.4, 643 P.2d 954, 957 n.4, 182
Cal. Rptr. 337, 340 n.4 (1982); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 235-
36, 512 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1987); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 347-48, 478 A.2d 755, 760
(1984).
16. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[s]tate
courts have been quick to accept wrongful birth as a cause of action since Roe v. Wade,
because it is not a significant departure from previous tort law); Lininger v. Eisenbaum,
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identify the underlying tort as much as it inartfully describes the re-
sult of the tort.""7 The same conclusion is true for wrongful life.
Although the first wrongful birth case was decided over fifty years
ago,'" wrongful birth and wrongful life actions were relatively rare
until the United States Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Con-
necticut 19 and Roe v. Wade 20 in 1965 and 1973, respectively. Pres-
ently, most state courts recognize wrongful birth actions, 2' but
generally refuse to recognize wrongful life actions. 22 The few legisla-
tures that have addressed the subject bar both types of actions.23 Even
in those jurisdictions that recognize causes of action for wrongful
birth or wrongful life or both, there is confusion concerning recover-
able damages.24
This Note discusses wrongful birth and wrongful life actions arising
from negligent genetic counseling and explains why they should be
recognized statutorily. Part II details the technological advances in
the field of genetics and their implications for the legal duty imposed
upon the medical profession. Part III traces the judicial develop-
ments that led to the gradual recognition of wrongful birth actions
and the refusal to recognize wrongful life actions. Part III~also dis-
cusses the recent legislation that has barred both wrongful birth and
wrongful life actions. Part IV proposes a model statute based on the
764 P.2d 1202, 1213 (Colo. 1988) (en banc) (Erickson, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part); see also infra note 162 and accompanying text.
17. Lininger, 764 P.2d at 1213 (Erickson, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part);
see also id. at 1205. The court noted the following:
[I]t is more accurate to view these terms as describing the result of a physician's
negligence. The asserted negligence may involve any number of distinguishable
negligent acts including, but not limited to, the misdiagnosis of an hereditary
condition, the misrepresentation of the risks associated with conception and de-
livery of a child, the negligent interpretation of diagnostic tests, or the negligent
performance of a sterilization procedure.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also supra note 15.
18. The first wrongful birth case, Christensen v. Thornby, was what would be termed a
"wrongful conception" case, see supra note 15, today. 192 Minn. 123, 255 N.W. 620
(1934) (negligently performed vasectomy led to birth of healthy child); accord Shaheen v.
Knight, 6 Lycoming R. 19, 11 Pa. D.&C.2d 41 (1957) (same); Zepeda v. Zepeda, 41 111.
App. 2d 240, 190 N.E.2d 849 (1963) (infant sued his father because of illegitimacy; recov-
ery was denied), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 945 (1964), was an early wrongful life case.
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing married couple's right to privacy regarding re-
productive choices).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding woman has right to choose abortion during first
trimester of pregnancy free from state interference, and that state has no legitimate inter-
est in life of fetus until point of viability). But see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21. See infra note 110 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
23. See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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following policy considerations: (1) procreative choice is constitution-
ally protected within the right of privacy; (2) individuals, and not
courts, should determine for their children whether existence with ge-
netic birth defects is preferable to nonexistence; (3) this type of medi-
cal malpractice should not go undeterred and the use of due care by
genetic counselors should be encouraged; and (4) victims of negli-
gence should be compensated in accordance with established princi-
ples of tort law.
II. Medical Background and Legal Implications
A discussion of wrongful birth and wrongful life actions arising
fromnegligent genetic counseling cannot proceed without first exam-
ining the process of genetic counseling itself, along with the necessary
elements of a medical malpractice action. Because research in the
field of genetics has uncovered so much new information within the
past few years, health care practitioners and prospective parents alike
should be aware of the latest genetic technologies and their potential
legal implications.
A. The Rapid Growth of Genetic Information and Technology
The number of genetic diseases 25 that can be detected by medical
science is growing at a phenomenal rate.26 The pace of genetic re-
search accelerated in the 1970's,27 particularly after Roe v. Wade,2" in
which the Supreme Court recognized a woman's constitutional right
to choose an abortion during the first trimester,2 9 and also due to
Congress' enactment of the National Sickle Cell Anemia, Cooley's
Anemia, Tay-Sachs and Genetic Diseases Act in 1976 (Genetic Dis-
25. Genetic diseases are "hereditary diseases, wholly or partly due to defective genes
and chromosomes." M. SANTOS, GENETICS AND MAN'S FUTURE: LEGAL, SOCIAL,
AND MORAL IMPLICATIONS OF GENETIC ENGINEERING 4 (1981).
According to a report provided by the National Institute of General Medical
Sciences an estimated 15 million Americans today suffer the consequences of
birth defects of varying severity. Not all of these disorders are genetic; 20 per-
cent are estimated not to contain a genetic component but represent the effect of
environmental factors such as infection, drugs, radiation, physical injury to the
fetus, etc. Thus the remaining 80 percent, or 12 million Americans, are afflicted
with [genetic] diseases ....
Id. at 3-4.
26. See Lapp6, The Limits of Genetic Inquiry, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT, Aug.
1987, at 5-6 [hereinafter Lapp,].
27. KEVLES, supra note 5, at 257.
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
29. See, e.g., Note, Wrongful Birth Actions: The Case Against Legislative Curtailment,
100 HARV. L. REV. 2017, 2021 (1987) [hereinafter Wrongful Birth Actions].
1989]
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eases Act).3" The Genetic Diseases Act authorized and provided fed-
eral funding for, inter alia, "projects for research in diagnosis,
treatment, and control (including prevention) of genetic diseases,
training programs for genetic counseling and related professions, edu-
cation programs for health care practitioners and the public, and de-
velopment of counseling and testing programs ... for the diagnosis,
prevention, control and treatment of genetic diseases."'" As a result
of ever-increasing scientific knowledge, legalized abortion, and Con-
gress' support of genetic research and genetic counseling, 32 the de-
mand for such genetic counseling services has increased. 33
Genetic counseling includes the use of prenatal diagnostic tests as
well as discussion of the test results with the prospective parents.34
The most common method of detecting birth defects used today35 is
the prenatal diagnostic procedure known as amniocentesis, 36 which
was widespread by the late 1960's.3 7 Other current techniques include
sonography, 38 fetoscopy 39 and two recently developed procedures,
chorionic villus sampling' and alpha-fetoprotein testing.4
30. Pub. L. No. 94-278, tit. IV, § 403(a), 9Q Stat. 407-09 (current version at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 300b-1 to 300b-4 (1976)) (amended 1981).
31. H.R. REP. No. 94-498, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 21-22, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 709, 729-30 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 300b-1 (1976)).
32. See P. REILLY, GENETICS, LAW & SOCIAL POLICY 104 (1977) [hereinafter
REILLY] ("it is clear that one purpose of the [Genetic Diseases Act] is to encourage
enlightened reproductive decisions").
33. See id. at 151; see also KEVLES, supra note 5, at 257.
34. See supra notes 2-9 and accompanying text; infra note 47 and accompanying text.
35. See KEVLES, supra note 5, at 294-95. "By the early eighties, amniocentesis could
detect ... about [100] chromosomal anomalies and about as many genetic disorders of a
molecular type." Id. at 294.
36. Amniocentesis involves penetrating the uterine wall with a hypodermic needle to
obtain cellular material. REILLY, supra note 32, at 24. The procedure is continued as
follows:
The syringe is inserted to avoid the placenta and the fetus (both of which can
usually be localized by a technique called ultrasonography), and a few milliliters
of amniotic fluid are withdrawn. This fluid, which usually contains sloughed-
off fetal cells, is then used to begin tissue cultures. After the fetal cells have
multiplied enough to provide sufficient material, certain diagnostic tests can be
performed. . . . The timing of amniocentesis is crucial to the success of the
diagnostic effort. The tap cannot be performed much earlier than the fifteenth
week of pregnancy, and diagnosis (depending on the disorder) may have to wait
three weeks while the fetal cells grow.
Id. (footnote omitted).
37. See KEVLES, supra note 5, at 257.
38. "Sonography is a method of using sound waves to form a pictorial outline of the
fetus in utero." Steele, supra note 3, at 346 n.c.
39. "Fetoscopy is a technique by which the fetus can be visualized directly by inser-
tion of a lighted optical tube into the uterus through the abdominal wall." Id.
40. The chorion is "the outermost fetal membrane; . . . on the maternal surface it
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In addition, scientists have recently completed a "map''42 of "ge-
netic markers" 43 along each.of the twenty-three paiirs of human chro-
mosomes. The map will be instrumental in pinpointing defective
genes involved in many serious genetic disorders." This discovery
will dramatically expand scientists' knowledge and understanding of
genetic disease and will undoubtedly increase the demand for genetic
counseling even further. Yet even though new medical discoveries are
always welcome, they simultaneously place a heavy burden on medi-
cal practitioners by expanding their potential liability.
B. Impact on Health Care Practitioners
The technological advances in detecting genetic diseases give rise to
many ethical, moral and social dilemmas.4 5 It is presumed, however,
that new medical techniques in the area of prenatal testing are used to
possesses villi [hair-like structures] that are bathed by maternal blood; as pregnancy pro-
gresses part of the chorion becomes the definitive.placenta." STEDMAN'S MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY 274 (5th Unabridged Lawyers' ed. 1982). The chorionic villus sampling detects
chromosomal disorders and its advantage is that is can be "offered at about 9 to 11 weeks
of pregnancy. Many experts believe it will eventually replace at least two-thirds of the
more familiar amniocentesis procedures, which can only be done in about the fourth
month of pregnancy." Tests of Fetuses Rise Sharply Amid Doubts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22,
1987, at CIO, col. 1.
41. See Annas, Is a Genetic Screening Test Ready When the Lawyers Say It Is?, 15
HASTINGS CENTER REP., Dec. 1985, at 16. This test detects certain types of genetic
disorders:
Alpha-fetoprotein is a major fetal serum protein secreted by the fetal kidneys,
and normally present in amniotic fluid in measurable amounts. It may also,
however, enter the amniotic fluid directly from exposed membrane surfaces on
the fetus, as in anencephaly [lack of a brain] or open spina bifida [a lesion on an
incompletely closed spinal cord]. There is also an association between elevated
levels of maternal serum alpha-fetoprotein (MSAFP) and NTDs [neural tube
defects, which are genetic disorders-such as anencephaly and spina bifida-
that occur approximately 1 to 2 per 1,000 live births]; measuring second trimes-
ter concentration of MSAFP has been shown to be an effective means of identi-
fying pregnant women who are at risk of having a fetus with a NTD.
Id.
42. New Map of Genes May Aid in Fighting Hereditary Diseases, N.Y. Times, Oct. 8,
1987, at Al, col. 6. A map of genetic markers is explained as follows:
What the scientists call a map is a set of nearly 400 recognizable short pieces of
DNA, the genetic material, that occur at known locations on the thread-like
strands of chromosomes. These standard pieces are used as markers that serve
as reference points for the location of genes along the chromosomes.'
Id.
43. Id.
44. Id. at B4, col. 4. "The achievement is expected to have an immediate impact on
the study of diseases that result from the failure or abnormal function of any single gene.
More than 3,000 such genetic diseases are known. Most are rare, but taken together they
pose a vast public health problem." Id. at B4, col. 5.
45. See supra note 10 and accompanying text; see also Tests of Fetuses Rise Sharply
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give a pregnant patient as much information as possible concerning
the health of her fetus.4 6 Imparting this information is, in fact, the
explicit purpose of genetic counseling.4" What course of action is
taken thereafter is left entirely to the patient and is essentially a pri-
vate decision.48 Giving the patient the opportunity to make such a
decision based on all available, accurate information is the primary
responsibility of the genetic counselor.49 If an error occurs in giving
or interpreting the test, the genetic counselor is faced with an ex-
tremely delicate and potentially volatile situation. 0 Parents who seek
genetic counseling expect to receive accurate information as to
whether or not they are carriers of a genetic disease. When they are
inforn;ed by a medical practitioner that they do not carry such a ge-
netic trait, and the child is subsequently born with genetic birth de-
fects, the parents have effectively been deprived of their right to make
Amid Doubts, N.Y. Times, Sept. 22, 1987, at Cl, col. 3 ("more than ever before, pregnant
women are being confronted with bewildering, unfamiliar decisions").
. The recent discovery of the map of genetic markers may lead to gene replacement
therapy which would allow "the replacement of a malfunctioning gene in a fetus." Calla-
han, How Technology is Refraining the Abortion Debate, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb.
1986, at 37. Although this technique would seem to be a welcome treatment for birth
defects in utero, one commentator has pointed out that at-risk adults are often counseled
against procreation, and affected fetuses are often aborted as early as possible. Lapp6,
supra note 26, at 9.
46. See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 6, at 24 ("[g]enetic counseling is a communication
process, a two-way question-and-answer session in which the counselor inquires about
the health of both parents, as well as other family members, and patients ask for informa-
tion in understandable terms so they can make informed decisions").
47. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 3, at 346 ("[tlhe object is to provide those at risk with
genetic information so that they can make informed decisions about future reproductive
efforts before the birth of a defective child") (footnote omitted). In 1974, an official defini-
tion of genetic counseling became accepted by the medical profession:
Genetic counseling is a communication process which deals with the human
problems associated with the occurrence, or risk of occurrence, of genetic disor-
der in a family. This process involves an attempt by one or more appropriately
trained persons to help the individual or family to: (1) comprehend the medical
facts, including the diagnosis, [and] probable course of the disorder . . .; (2)
appreciate the way heredity contributes to the disorder, and the risk of recur-
rence in specified relatives; (3) understand the alternatives for dealing with the
risk of recurrence; (4) choose the course of action which seems to them appro-
priate in view of their risk, their family goals, and their ethical and religious
standards, and to act in accordance with that decision; and (5) to make the best
possible adjustment to the disorder in an affected family member and/or to the
risk of recurrence of that disorder.
Ad Hoc Committee on Genetic Counseling, Genetic Counseling, 27 AM. J. HUM. GENET-
iCs 240, 240-41 (1975).
48. See infra notes 107-10, 148-56 and accompanying text.
49. See supra notes 46-47 and accompanying text.
50. See infra notes 156-63 and accompanying text,.
1989] WRONGFUL BIRTH A CTIONS
an informed decision to terminate or continue the pregnancy.5" As a
result, parents who would have chosen to terminate a pregnancy suf-
fer various financial and emotional injuries from the birth of an infant
with genetic birth defects. 2 This claim is the essence of a wrongful
birth action. 3 Additionally, a suit on behalf of the genetically defec-
tive infant claims that the deprivation of an informed decision by his
parents wrongfully caused the infant's birth. 4 This claim is the basis
of a wrongful life action. 5 Thus, wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions are merely medical malpractice suits,56 and the application of
standard negligence principles57 indicates that genetic counselors
should be subject to liability.
1. Duty and Informed Consent
Using due care to obtain and relay relevant genetic data to prospec-
tive parents who seek genetic counseling has been held to be part of
the health care practitioner's "duty correlative to [the] parents' right
to prevent the birth of defective children. '"58
This duty requires health care providers to impart to their patients
material information as to the likelihood of future children being
51. See infra notes 148-59 and accompanying text.
52. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 253, 512 N.E.2d
691, 703 (1987); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Naccash v.
Burger, 223 Va. 406, 414, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830 (1982).
53. See, e.g., Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 253, 512 N.E.2d at 703; see also supra note 15.
54. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 229-31, 643 P.2d 954, 959-60, 182 Cal.
Rptr. 337, 342-43 (1982) (en banc); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 348, 478 A.2d 755,
760 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 478, 656 P.2d 483, 494
(1983) (en banc).
55. See, e.g., Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 236, 512 N.E.2d at 695; see also supra note 15.
56. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981); Turpin, 31
Cal. 3d at 229-30, 643 P.2d at 959, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 342-43; Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 410, 386 N.E.2d 807, 811, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 899 (1978); Harbeson, 98
Wash. 2d at 467-68, 656 P.2d at 488-89.
57. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (1977) (statement of elements for
cause of action in negligence).
The traditional formula for the elements necessary to such a cause of action
may be stated briefly as follows: 1. A duty, or obligation, recognized by the law,
requiring the person to conform to a certain standard of conduct, for the protec-
tion of others against unreasonable risks. 2. A failure on the person's part to
conform to the standard required: a breach of the duty .... 3. A reasonably
close causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury. This is
what is commonly known as 'legal cause,' or 'proximate cause,' and which in-
cludes the notion of cause in fact. 4. Actual loss or damage resulting to the
interests of another. ...
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 30, at 164-65 (W. Keeton, D. Dobbs,
R. Keeton & D. Owen 5th ed. 1984) (citations omitted) [hereinafter PROSSER &
KEETON].
58. Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 471, 656 P.2d at 491.
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born defective, to enable the potential parents to decide whether to
avoid the conception or birth of such children. If medical proce-
dures are undertaken to avoid the conception or birth of defective
children, the duty also requires that these procedures be performed
with due care.5 9
Recognition of such a duty, along with the establishment of an appro-
priate standard of care6" for genetic counselors,6' supports society's
interest in quality health care and deters medical malpractice.6 z
The informed consent doctrine 63 has been held to apply to the legal
duty of genetic counselors 64 because the purpose of genetic counseling
59. Id. at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
60. See James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 879 (W. Va. 1985) ("[w]ith the in-
creased knowledge in this field of genetic counseling, there is the concomitant recognition
that the ordinary standard of care may require appropriate tests and counseling with
parents who are more likely to bear children with birth defects"). Generally, a physician
"must have and use the knowledge, skill and care ordinarily possessed and employed by
members of the profession in good standing .. " PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 57,
§ 32, at 187. "It remains primarily the responsibility of the physician to ensure that ap-
propriate information is conveyed to his patient, depending on her particular circum-
stances." Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416, 443 (1983). At
least one commentator has stated that the standard for genetic counselors must include
disclosure of all material information needed to make an informed procreative decision.
See Note, A Preference for Nonexistence: Wrongful Life and a Proposed Tort of Genetic
Malpractice, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 477, 497 (1982). See generally Capron, supra note 4, at
673-80 (discussing standards of confidentiality in genetic counseling); Reilly, Professional
Identification: Issues in Licensing and Certification, in GENETIC COUNSELING: FACTS,
VALUES, AND NORMS 291-305 (A. Capron, M. Lappe, R. Murray, T. Powledge, S.
Twiss, & D. Bergsma ed. 1979) (discussing pros and cons of regulation of genetic counsel-
ors); see also infra note 61.
61. Obstetricians are not the only medical practitioners who provide genetic counsel-
ing services. "The profession of genetic counseling has grown up hand-in-hand with the
progress of advanced screening techniques. Most counselors are graduates of master's
degree programs in genetic counseling and have passed a certification exam. But some
MDs, PhDs, social workers and nurses who have gained expertise in the field also coun-
sel." Lewis, supra note 6, at 24; see Note, The Injury of Birth: Minnesota's Statutory
Prohibition of Postconception Negligence Actions, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 701, 704
n.10 (1988); see also supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text.
62. See infra note 162 and accompanying text.
63. See, e.g., REILLY, supra note 32, at 164-65; Note, Father and Mother Know Best:
Defining the Liability of Physicians for Inadequate Genetic Counseling, 87 YALE L.J.
1488, 1506-08 (1978). The doctrine generally requires the medical practitioner to explain
to the patient:
[t]he nature of the pertinent ailment or condition, the risks of the proposed
treatment or procedure, and the risks of any alternative methods of treatment,
including the risks of failing to undergo any treatment at all. Thus, although
the procedure be skillfully performed, the doctor may nevertheless be liable for
an adverse consequence about which the patient was not adequately informed.
PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 57, § 32, at 190 (footnotes omitted).
64. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 746 F.2d 517, 522 (9th Cir. 1984).
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is to promote informed decisionmaking by prospective parents.65 The
informed consent doctrine "is based on principles of individual auton-
omy, and specifically on the premise that every person has the right to
determine what shall be done to his own body."'6 6 "To allow this de-
termination the health care provider must provide the individual with
sufficient information to make an 'intelligent' decision."'67 Because it
would impose an extremely heavy burden on physicians to require
disclosure of every possible risk or possible alternative, the courts gen-
erally state that a doctor's duty is to disclose the "material" risks 68
which are commonly known in the medical profession.69 According
to the Ninth Circuit, materiality includes: (1) defining the nature of
the risk; (2) determining its likelihood of occurrence; and (3) whether
the reasonable person in the patient's position would attach signifi-
cance to the risk.7" Furthermore, if the physician is a specialist and
65. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
66. PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 57, § 32, at 190 (citing Schloendorff v. Society of
N.Y. Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 129, 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914) (Cardozo, J.)). In its traditional
context, the informed consent doctrine applied only when a physically invasive procedure
had taken place and the doctor neglected to inform the patient of some risk or other
alternatives to surgery. See, e.g., PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 57, § 32, at 190;
Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New Protected Interest, 95 YALE
L.J. 219, 227-28 (1985).
67. Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522, (citing Smith v. Shannon, 100 Wash. 2d 26, 29, 666
P.2d 351, 354 (1983) (emphasis in original)); see Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772,
786-87 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1064 (1972).
68. See, e.g., Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522; Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787; see also PROS-
SER & KEETON, supra note 57, § 32, at 191.
The extent of this duty to disclose has traditionally been based upon a profes-
sional medical standard-whether physicians customarily inform their patients
about the type of risk involved, or whether a reasonable physician would make
the disclosure in the circumstances. Since the use of a professional standard
paternalistically leaves the right of choice to the medical community, in deroga-
tion of the patient's right of self-determination, a number of recent cases have
defined the duty in terms of the patient's need to know the information-based
on whether a reasonable person in the patient's position would attach signifi-
cance to the information.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
69. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 299A (1977) ("one who un-
dertakes to render services in the practice of a profession or trade is required to exercise
the skill and knowledge normally possessed by members of that profesion or trade in
good standing in similar communities").
70. Harbeson, 746 F.2d at 522-23. In the Harbeson case, Mrs. Harbeson began taking
the drug Dilantin for treatment of epilepsy during her first pregnancy. Id. at 519. Her
child was born healthy and normal. Id. Before having more children, the Harbesons
consulted three physicians about the possible risks associated with taking Dilantin during
pregnancy. Id. All three doctors informed them "that taking Dilantin during pregnancy
could cause cleft palate, which could be surgically repaired, and hirsutism, a temporary
condition of excess hair." Id. The Harbesons relied on this advice and proceeded to have
two more children. Id. These two children were subsequently diagnosed as having Fetal
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possesses superior knowledge or skills, he is required to use that
knowledge and thus may be liable where a general practitioner is
not.71
In the genetic counseling context, the informed consent doctrine
should require full disclosure of the material risks-i.e., the risk of
genetic birth defects which are known and detectable by accepted
medical procedures-to the prospective parents so that they may de-
cide whether they want to continue the pregnancy. 2 Of course it
would not apply to those parents who refuse testing or counseling, or
those who would not have had an abortion in any event. The in-
formed consent doctrine should result in imposing such a duty of dis-
closure on physicians because the right to make private reproductive
decisions is constitutionally protected. 3 By failing to disclose a mate-
rial risk of genetic birth defects, the physician deprives the pregnant
woman of the ability to make an informed decision regarding continu-
ation or termination of her pregnancy.74
Hydantoin Syndrome, which consisted of growth deficiencies, developmental retardation,
and other physical, mental and developmental defects. Id. The district court found that
the three physicians failed to conduct a search of the medical literature, which would
have uncovered the "hallmark" article concerning the risks of Dilantin. Id. This article
stated that major congenital malformations were 2-3 times more likely to occur in chil-
dren born to mothers taking Dilantin. Id. at 523. The Ninth Circuit found this risk to be
material because it was likely to occur, it was reasonably foreseeable, and a reasonable
patient would have considered the risk significant. Id. at 524.
71. See, e.g., Toth v. Community Hosp. at Glen Cove, 22 N.Y.2d 255, 262, 239
N.E.2d 368, 372-73, 292 N.Y.S.2d 440, 447 (1968).
72. The Washington Supreme Court expressly held the informed consent doctrine
applicable to the disclosure of "material information as to the likelihood of future chil-
dren being born defective." Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 472, 656 P.2d at 491.
73. The right of privacy is frequently asserted in medical decisionmaking cases. See,
e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973). "In fact, Roe has emerged as the key
precedent in the trend toward expanded protection of patients' rights in medical decision
making." Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong with Fetal
Rights, 10 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 9, 17 (1987) [hereinafter Gallagher]; see also Andrews v.
Ballard, 498 F. Supp. 1038, 1046-47 (S.D. Tex. 1980) (decision to obtain or reject medical
treatment falls within scope of right of privacy); In re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40-41, 355
A.2d 647, 663-64 (right of privacy encompasses right of permanently noncognitive pa-
tient to be terminated from life support systems), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976); Su-
perintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728, 739, 370 N.E.2d
417, 424 (1977).
74. "As long as abortion remains an option allowed by law, the physician owes a duty
to furnish patients with adequate information for them to be able to decide whether to
choose that course of action." Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 46-47, 412 N.W.2d
232, 238 (1987). Even before abortion was legalized, abortions were considered allowable
when the fetus suffered severe birth defects. The Supreme Court noted in Roe v. Wade
that the model abortion codes of both the American Bar Association and the American
Legal Institute allowed abortions in such circumstances. 410 U.S. 113, 140, 146 n.40
(1973); see also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 205 (1973). The American Medical Associa-
tion's Committee on Human Reproduction also approved of abortion in cases where the
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In most cases, the physician's duty should extend to the woman's
husband as well, particularly if he is actively involved in the genetic
counseling with the physician. This is especially true if the father is
tested for genetic abnormalities and therefore assumes the role of a
patient. 7  Although Roe v. Wade and its progeny afforded constitu-
tional protection to the pregnant woman alone, it has been noted that:
[P]rivacy emerged as a notion.., involving the privacy of the mar-
ital bedroom, [76] and that typically in the genetics context the in-
terests of the couple, and not solely of the woman, will be at stake.
Thus, to the extent that constitutional law is useful to suggest the
nature and importance of the interests involved, the duties of the
counselor are owed to both prospective parents, although the pro-
spective mother retains exclusive authority over decisions concern-
ing the termination of her pregnancy.77
While it seems logical that the genetic counselor should have a duty
to impart accurate genetic information to the pregnant patient, the
issue is more complex when a duty to the fetus is considered. Some
courts have held that a wrongful life action cannot lie because the
physician's duty runs only to the mother and not to the fetus. 78 A few
courts have recognized the anomaly, however, of limiting the physi-
cian's duty to the mother alone. 79 Because genetic counseling directly
concerns the health and welfare of the fetus, and because the existence
of the fetus is wholly dependent on the pregnant woman, 80 it follows
child "may be born with incapacitating physical deformity or mental deficiency." Roe,
410 U.S. at 142. See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
75. See supra note 12.
76. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (footnote incorporated).
77. Capron, supra note 4, at 646.
78. See, e.g., James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 880 (W. Va. 1985).
79. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1215 (Colo. 1988) (Mullarkey, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("[i]t is well-established that a physician owes a
duty of care to an infant who is born alive and the infant has an independent claim for
relief based on breach of that duty); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 348-49, 478 A.2d 755,
760 (1984); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 480, 656 P.2d 483, 495
(1983) (en banc); accord Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 434, 404 A.2d 8, 20 (1979) (Han-
dler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
80. While the above mentioned may state the obvious, there is much controversy con-
cerning the legal status of fetuses. See Johnsen, A New Threat to Pregnant Women's
Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug. 1987, at 35.
In attempting to reconcile the sometimes competing interests inherent in the
maternal-fetal relationship, we must not lose sight of the biological and psycho-
logical realities of that relationship. The fetus is a physical part of a particular
woman and is completely dependent upon her for its continued development
and very existence .... Any legal recognition granted to the fetus as a distinct
entity inevitably affects the pregnant woman. Conversely, virtually anything
the pregnant woman does potentially has some effect on the fetus.
Id. For further analysis of the conflicts between recognition of fetal rights and women's
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that any duty owed the fetus would necessarily occur through the
mother.8' It is reasonably foreseeable that the combined result of the
physician's advice and its subsequent impact on the mother's decision
will significantly affect the fetus.82 Physicians should owe two duties
that are wholly interdependent because parents seek genetic counsel-
ing not only for themselves, but also for their future children.8"
2. Causation
It has been argued that wrongful birth and wrongful life actions
cannot lie because the genetic counselor does not cause the child's
birth defects-rather, the parents' genes cause the disease.84 The per-
tinent issue, however, is not the source of the genetic flaw; rather, it is
the genetic counselor's failure to advise the patient adequately,
thereby depriving the patient of the chance to make an informed deci-
sion. 85 This negligence proximately causes the birth of a genetically
impaired child-an event which the parents specifically sought to
rights to personal autonomy, see Gallagher, supra note 73, at 9-58; Note, The Creation of
Fetal Rights. Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal
Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599-625 (1986).
81. See supra note 80; cf Comment, "Wrongful Life": The Right Not To Be Born, 54
TUL. L. REV. 480, 490 (1980) (one approach to duty is that duty owed to parents inures
derivatively to child); PESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 311 (1977) ("one who negli-
gently gives false information to another is subject to liability for physical harm caused by
action taken by the other in reasonable reliance upon such information, where such harm
results ... to such persons as the actor should expect to be put in peril by the action
taken").
82. See, e.g., Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 480-81, 656 P.2d at 495-96 (holding that a
physician's duty extends to persons not yet conceived at the time of the negligent act or
omission because it is foreseeable that future children are endangered by physicians' neg-
ligence in advising the mother erroneously).
83. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1214-15 (Colo. 1988) (Mullar-
key, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "Parents, as natural and legal guardians of
children, have the legal capacity to make many decisions in behalf of children who are
incapable of doing so." PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 57,.§ 32, at 115.
84. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 236, 512 N.E.2d
691, 695 (1987); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 417-18, 386 N.E.2d 807, 816, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 904-05 (1978) (Wachtler, J., dissenting in part); Ellis v. Sherman, 512 Pa.
14, 19, 515 A.2d 1327, 1329 (1986).
85. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 477 (7th Cir. 1981) (wrongful
birth action not based on injuries to fetus but on defendant physician's failure to diagnose
plaintiff's rubella and its effects on her fetus); James G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 881
(W. Va. 1985). "The relevant causal relationship in wrongful life cases is between the
defendant's negligence and the subsequent birth of the child, not between the defendant's
negligence and the genetic impairment of the child." Continental Casualty Co. v. Empire
Casualty Co., 713 P.2d 384, 393 (Colo. App. 1985), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Empire
Casualty Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 764 P.2d 1191 (Colo. 1988), overruled in
part, Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202 (Colo. 1988); see also supra note 9 and ac-
companying text; infra notes 91, 159 and accompanying text.
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avoid by obtaining the genetic counselor's advice (provided that they
planned to abort in such circumstances).86 Moreover, it is a natural
and foreseeable result of negligent genetic counseling that a child with
birth defects will be born.8"
In addition to establishing proximate cause through the medical
practitioner's failure to provide material information, a plaintiff must
also establish cause in fact by proving that she would not have under-
gone the treatment-in the genetic counseling context, the preg-
nancy-had she known of the material risk involved.88 Most courts
have adopted an objective standard of causation, i.e., whether a rea-
sonable person in plaintiff's position would have withheld consent to
the treatment;8 9 while other courts have adopted a subjective causa-
tion test, i.e., whether that particular plaintiff would have avoided the
treatment, had sufficient information been provided. 9°
3. Injury and Calculation of Damages
In wrongful birth actions, the injury suffered by parents is the birth
of the genetically impaired child because the parents specifically
sought to avoid this occurrence, but through the doctor's breach of
duty, they were deprived of the choice to terminate the pregnancy.9'
This injury results in two types of damages: (1) economic injury asso-
ciated with the extraordinary medical and educational costs of raising
a handicapped child;92 and (2) emotional distress. 93 Traditionally the
86. Whether the parents would have chosen to abort would be a triable issue of fact.
See infra note 88 and accompanying text.
87. See, e.g., Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773, 779 (4th Cir. 1988); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 445, 404 A.2d 8, 20-21 (1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part, dis-
senting in part); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 481, 656 P.2d 483, 496
(1983) (en banc).
88. See supra note 68.
89. See PROSSER & KEETON, supra note 57, § 32 at 191.
90. Id. at 192. The objective causation test is probably more appropriate in the con-
text of wrongful birth and wrongful life suits. The subjective causation test would be too
easily satisfied because any plaintiff could claim that she would have sought an abortion.
The objective test, however, would determine whether a reasonable person in the plain-
tiff's position would have sought an abortion. See infra notes 169-70 and accompanying
text.
91. See, e.g., Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 466-67, 656 P.2d 483,
488 (1983) (en banc) ("parents' right to prevent a defective child and the correlative duty
flowing from that right is the heart of the wrongful birth action").
92. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 476 (7th Cir. 1981); Turpin v.
Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 237-39, 643 P.2d 954, 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348-49 (1982)
(en banc); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 885-86 (D.C. 1987); Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401, 412-13, 386 N.E.2d 807, 813-14, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901-02 (1978); James
G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882-83 (W. Va. 1985) (parents also recovered child's
postmajority expenses because child would never be self-supporting).
93. See, e.g., Phillips v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 1309, 1319-20 (D.S.C. 1983) (par-
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courts refused to find that the birth of any child could ever be an
injury to parents, 94 and also declined to award emotional distress
damages.95 The courts did, however, realize that extraordinary costs
were involved in the rearing of a handicapped child, and so most suc-
cessful wrongful birth plaintiffs recovered medical and educational
costs on an economic injury theory.96 As noted by one court:
In authorizing.., recovery by the parents, courts have recognized
(1) that these are expenses that would not have been incurred "but
for" the defendants' negligence and (2) that they are the kind of
pecuniary losses, which are readily ascertainable and regularly
awarded as damages in professional malpractice actions.9"
Wrongful life suits have generally not succeeded because the infant
plaintiff alleges that his very life is an injury to him, i.e., but for the
physician's negligence, the infant would not have been born.98 The
courts generally refuse to recognize this kind of claim as a valid cause
of action because of the presumption that life in any condition is pref-
ents of Down's syndrome child recovered $500,000 for emotional distress; court reduced
award by 50% due to "offsetting benefits" theory of torts (see infra note 95)); Naccash v.
Burger, 290 S.E.2d 825, 831 (Va. 1982) ("evidence shows an unbroken chain of causal
connection directly linking the erroneous Tay-Sachs report, the deprivation of the par-
ents' opportunity to accept or reject the continuance of Mrs. Burger's pregnancy, and the
emotional distress the parents suffered following the birth of their fatally defective
child"); see also infra notes 180-81.
94. See, e.g., Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 29, 227 A.2d 689, 693 (1967) (to
calculate damages "a court would have to evaluate the denial to [parents] of the intangi-
ble, unmeasurable, and complex human benefits of motherhood and fatherhood and
weigh these against the alleged emotional and money injuries").
95. See, e.g., Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 414-15, 386 N.E.2d at 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 902
("parents may yet experience a love that even an abnormality cannot fully dampen").
The court in Becker did not award emotional distress damages because the joy the par-
ents would derive in raising the child offset any emotional distress caused by the genetic
defect. Id. at 413, 386 N.E.2d at 813, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901. This rationale is known as
the "offsetting benefits" theory of torts. -See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920
(1977). "When the defendant's tortious conduct has caused harm to the plaintiff or to his
property and in so doing has conferred a special benefit to the interest of the plaintiff that
was harmed, the value of the benefit conferred is considered in mitigation of damages, to
the extent that this is equitable." Id.
96. See supra note 92.
97. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 238, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 348
(1982) (en banc).
98. See supra notes 15, 54-55. and accompanying text. The court in Lininger v.
Eisenbaum criticized the courts which have recognized wrongful life actions because they
did not expressly hold that the infant was injured; rather, those cases were decided on
equitable principles. 764 P.2d 1202, 1211-12 (Colo. 1988); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339,
351-52, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (1984) ("whatever logic inheres in permitting parents to re-
cover for the cost of extraordinary medical care incurred by a birth-defective child, but in
denying the child's own right to recover those expenses, must yield to the injustice of that
result)."
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erable to nonexistence, and therefore can never be an injury. 99 The
courts have also stated that damages in wrongful life actions are too
speculative to calculate.100
III. Historical Background
Although wrongful birth and wrongful life actions are simply spe-
cific types of medical malpractice suits, there has been much opposi-
tion to them due in large part to anti-abortion sentiment. The courts,
however, have gradually come to recognize wrongful birth, and a
small minority of courts have come to recognize wrongful life as well.
Despite this judicial trend-at least for wrongful birth claims-a few
state legislatures have enacted statutes barring both claims, while only
one state has legislation which permits both.
A. The Judicial Trend
The seminal case which served as the model for most of the wrong-
ful birth and wrongful life cases was Gleitman v. Cosgrove.'0 ' In
Gleitman, the defendant physician negligently advised Mrs. Gleitman
* that her exposure to rubella during the first trimester of her preg-
nancy would have no effect at all on the infant,1°2 and the child was
subsequently born with severe congenital birth defects. 103 In denying
recovery to both the infant and his parents,0 4 the New Jersey
Supreme Court relied on two rationales which have become the most
widely cited reasons for barring wrongful life actions. First, public
policy supports the sanctity of human life and presumes that existence
in any state of health is always preferable to nonexistence; 10 5 and sec-
99. See infra notes 105-06, 111-15 and accompanying text. See generally Pace, The
Treatment of Injury in WrongfulLife Claims, 20 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 145, 145-66
(1986) (concluding that wrongful life actions must fail for want of injury).
100. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
101. 49 N.J. 22, 227 A.2d 689 (1967). It should be noted that this case was decided
after Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), but before Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973). Gleitman was later overruled in part by Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 404
A.2d 8 (1979) (recognizing cause of action for wrongful birth, but only allowing parents
recovery for emotional distress), and in turn, Berman was overruled in part by Procanik
v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 355, 478 A.2d 755, 757 (1984) (recognizing cause of action for
wrongful life and allowing infant plaintiff to recover special damages of extraordinary
medical expenses attributable to his affliction). For a detailed analysis of Gleitman's im-
pact on later cases, see Rogers, supra note 15, at 721-30, 742-48.
102. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 24, 227 A.2d at 690.
103. Id. The infant was blind, deaf, mute and probably mentally retarded. Id. at 49,
227 A.2d at 703 (Jacobs, J., dissenting).
104. Id. at 48-49, 227 A.2d at 692-93.
105. "It is basic to the human condition to seek life and hold on to it however heavily
burdened." Id. at 30, 227 A.2d at 693; accord Blake v. Cruz, 108 Idaho 253, 260, 698
46 FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. XVII
ond, damages are incalculable because a court cannot measure the
value of never having been born.
10 6
After the Supreme Court decided Roe v. Wade '0 7 in 1973, courts
generally, recognized that procreative self-determination was part of
an individual's right to privacy.10 8  Moreover, as the popularity of
family planning through the use of contraceptives and sterilization
procedures increased in the post-Roe years, 10 9 many courts began to
recognize wrongful birth actions.' 0
Wrongful life actions, however, did not meet with such ready ac-
ceptance.' 1 ' In rejecting wrongful life actions, the courts have stated
P.2d 315, 322 (1984); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 238-39, 512
N.E.2d 691, 697 (1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 254, 718 P.2d 635, 642
(1986); Strohmaier v. Associates in Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 122 Mich. App. 116,
121, 332 N.W.2d 432, 434-35 (1982); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 248, 513 A.2d 341,
352-53 (1986); Becker v. Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 411, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413
N.Y.S.2d 895, 900 (1978); Nelson v. Krusen, 678 S.W.2d 918, 925 (Tex. 1984); Dumer v.
St. Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 772-73, 233 N.W.2d 372, 375-76 (1975).
106. Gleitman, 49 N.J. at 28-29, 227 A.2d at 692-93. "The infant plaintiff would have
us measure the difference between his life with defects against the utter void of non-
existence, but it is impossible to make such a determination." 49 N.J. at 28, 227 A.2d at
692.
107. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
108. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (procreative
decision is couple's "choice and the courts are required to respect it"), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 983 (1983); Rogers, supra note 15, at 722-23; see also infra notes 148-55 and accom-
panying text.
109. See, e.g., Hartke, 707 F.2d at 1552 ("when a couple has chosen not to have chil-
dren, or not to have any more children, the suggestion arises that for them, at least, the
birth of a child would not be a net benefit"); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253, 187
N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971) ("public policy cannot be said to disfavor contraception"); see
also supra note 5.
110. See, e.g., Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 475 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[s]ince Roe
v. Wade, . . . precedents [of state courts] have been unanimous in recognizing a cause of
action for the parents of a child born as a result of a physician's negligence") (footnote
omitted); Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 258, 512 N.E.2d 691, 705-
06 (1987); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 361-62, 308 N.W.2d 209, 211
(1981); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 238-39, 513 A.2d 341, 345"46 (1986); Berman v.
Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 436, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979) (holding that Roe v. Wade invalidates
Gleitman v. Cosgrove's rationale for rejecting wrongful birth actions); Becker v. Schwartz,
46 N.Y.2d 401, 417, 386 N.E.2d 807, 815, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 903 (1978) (Fuchsberg, J.,
concurring); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 414, 290 S.E.2d 825, 829-30 (1982); James
G. v. Caserta, 332 S.E.2d 872, 882 (W. Va. 1985).
111. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 695 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) (recognizing wrongful birth but rejecting wrongful life); Elliott v. Brown, 361
So. 2d 546, 548 (Ala. 1978) (rejecting wrongful life); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d
1202, 1212-13, (Colo. 1988) (recognizing wrongful birth but rejecting wrongful life); Sie-
mieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 251, 512 N.E.2d 691, 702 (1987) (same);
Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 430, 404 A.2d 8, 13 (1979) (same); Becker v. Schwartz, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 416, 386 N.E.2d 807, 814, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 902-03 (1978) (same); Jacobs
v. Theimer, 519 S.W.2d 846, 849 (Tex. 1975) (rejecting wrongful life); Dumer v. St.
Michael's Hosp., 69 Wis. 2d 766, 773, 233 N.W.2d 372, 376 (1975) (same).
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that the genetically defective infant suffers no legally cognizable injury
by being born." 2  For example, in Becker v. Schwartz,"3 the New
York Court of Appeals declined to hold that a genetically impaired
infant's life could be wrongful, stating that "[w]hether it is better
never to have been born at all than to have been born with even gross
deficiencies is a mystery more properly to be left to the philosophers
and the theologians."' 14 Other state courts, when deciding a wrongful
life case for the first time, have found Becker's rationale persuasive. 5
Currently, wrongful life actions are still rejected by most courts. 116
In fact, only three states have accepted them judicially-California,"I7
New Jersey" 8 and Washington." 9  These courts have held that al-
lowing the infant a cause of action does not conflict with the sanctity
of human life,' 2 ° and that life, particularly life with severe birth de-
112. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text; infra notes 113-15 and accompany-
ing text.
113. 46 N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978). Becker concerned a 37
year old woman who gave birth to a Down's syndrome child. Plaintiffs were never ad-
vised of the increased risk to pregnant women over age 35 and also were never advised of
the availability of an amniocentesis test. Id. at 405-06, 386 N.E.2d at 808-09, 413
N.Y.S.2d at 896-97; see also supra note 15. Becker's companion case, Park v. Chessin, 46
N.Y.2d 401, 386 N.E.2d 807, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895 (1978), concerned a woman who gave
birth to a child with polycystic kidney disease. She had previously given birth to a child
with the same disease who died five hours after birth. Defendant obstetricians had ad-
vised her that the disease was not hereditary, and that the chances of the disease reoccur-
ing in another child were "practically nil." Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 406-07, 386 N.E.2d at
809, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 897.
114. Id. at 411, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900. The court further stated:
"[s]imply put, a cause of action brought on behalf of an infant seeking recovery for
wrongful life demands a calculation of damages dependent upon a comparison between
the Hobson's choice of life in an impaired state and nonexistence. This comparison the
law is not-equipped to make." Id. at 412, 386 N.E.2d at 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 900.
115. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 243, 512 N.E.2d
691, .698 (1987); Bruggeman v. Schimke, 239 Kan. 245, 250-51, 718 P.2d 635, 640-41
(1986); Eisbrenner v. Stanley, 106 Mich. App. 357, 366, 308 N.W.2d 209, 213 (1981);
Wilson v. Kuenzi, 751 S.W.2d 741, 744-45 (Mo.) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 229
(1988); Smith v. Cote, 128 N.H. 231, 247, 513 A.2d 341, 351 (1986); Azzolino v.
Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 109-10, 337 S.E.2d 528, 533 (1985), cert, denied, 479 U.S. 835
(1986). But see Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 358, 478 A.2d 755, 765 (1984) (Handler,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("the [c]ourt itself need not express a preference
of life over nonlife but only to understand that individuals in necessitous situations have
the right to make that choice").
116. See, e.g., Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1212-13 (Colo. 1988) (en banc);
Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 251, 512 N.E.2d at 702; Pitre v. Opelousas Gen. Hosp., 517 So.
2d 1019, 1024-25 (La. App. 1987), aff'd inpart, rev'd inpart, 530 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1988).
117. Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 349
(1982) (en banc).
118. Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 355-56, 478 A.2d 755, 764 (1984).
119. Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 483, 656 P.2d 483, 497 (1983)
(en banc).
120. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233-34, 643 P.2d at 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345;
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fects, is not always preferable to nonlife. 2 ' Furthermore, these deci-
sions treat wrongful life actions like other medical malpractice
actions,'2 2 and note that in most circumstances parents make the
medical choices on behalf of an infant or fetus.' 23 Damages are lim-
ited, however, to the extraordinary expenses to be incurred during the
child's lifetime as a result of the genetic defect; if these expenses are
recovered by the parents in a wrongful birth action, they may not be
recovered again by the child in a wrongful life action.I24 These courts
have been unwilling to award the infant general damages because:
(1) general damages are incalculable;' 25 or (2) the fact that the infant
is alive will offset any award of general damages. 26
B. Recent Legislative Developments
Since 1986, six states have enacted statutes 27 prohibiting wrongful
Procanik, 97 N.J. at 353, 478 A.2d at 763; Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 481-82, 656 P.2d at
496.
121. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 234, 643 P.2d at 961, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45; Procanik,
97 N.J. at 354, 478 A.2d 763; Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496. In Turpin,
the court noted the following:
[I]t is hard to see how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffer-
ing child would 'disavow' the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is
not entitled to the full measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges ac-
corded to all members of society .... Moreover, while our society and our legal
system unquestionably place the highest value on all human life, we do not
think that it is accurate to suggest that this state's public policy establishes-as
a matter of law-that under all circumstances 'impaired life' is 'preferable' to
'nonlife'.... [P]ublic policy supports the right of each individual to make his or
her own determination as to the relative value of life and death.
Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 233, 643 P.2d at 961-62, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
122. See supra notes 16, 56 and accompanying text.
123. See, e.g., Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 234 n.9, 643 P.2d at 962 n.9, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345
n.9; see also supra note 83.
124. See Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at 237-39, 643 P.2d at 965-66, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 348-49
(either parents or child may recover out-of-pocket extraordinary expenses); Procanik, 97
N.J. at 351-52, 478 A.2d at 762 (either child or parents may recover extraordinary medi-
cal expenses incurred during infancy, and infant may recover those expenses during his
majority); Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 480, 656 P.2d at 495 ("[i]f the parents recover such
costs for the child's minority in a wrongful birth action, the child will be limited to the
costs to be incurred during his majority").
125. See Turpin, 31 Cal.3d at 236, 643 P.2d at 963, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 346; Procanik, 97
N.J. at 354, 478 A.2d at 763; Harbeson, 98 Wash.2d at 481, 656 P.2d at 496.
126. See Turpin, 31 Cal.3d at 237-38, 643 P.2d at 964, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
127. See IDAHO CODE § 5-334 (Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-1-1-11 (Burns
1988 Supp.) (prohibiting wrongful life only); MINN. STAT. § 145.424 (1989); Mo. ANN.
STAT. § 188.130 (Vernon Supp. 1989); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-55-1 to -4
(1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-11-24 (1987). The language used in each statute is simi-
lar to that of South Dakota's, for example: "There shall be no cause of action or award of
damages on behalf of any person based on the claim that, but for the conduct of another,
a person would not have been permitted to have been born alive." S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
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birth and wrongful life actions, despite the general judicial trend in
favor of allowing wrongful birth actions.12 s While the constitutional-
ity of such statutes has been questioned, 129 one state's highest court
has already upheld its statute as constitutional. 3 ° In Hickman v.
Group Health Plan, Inc., I1 the Supreme Court of Minnesota reversed
the trial court, which had held Minnesota's statute prohibiting wrong-
ful birth actions to be unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade. 32 The
court's reversal stated that there was: (1) no due process violation
because no state action was involved;133 (2) no equal protection viola-
tion because no suspect class was involved;' 34 and (3) no significant
burden on a woman's right to an abortion was present.'35
The dissent declared, however, that due process was violated be-
cause the state, through its statute, injected itself into the physician-
patient relationship,'36 and that state interference with a woman's de-
ANN. § 21-55-2 (1987). Similar legislation has been introduced in 21 other states. See
Wrongful Birth Actions, supra note 29, at 2019 n.7.
128. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
129. See Wrongful Birth Actions, supra note 29, at 2017-34 (arguing that prohibition of
wrongful birth actions is unconstitutional as violating due process and equal protection);
cf Henifin, Hubbard & Norsigian, Prenatal Screening, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR
THE 1990s: A BRIEFING HANDBOOK 129, 146 (N. Taub & S. Cohen ed. 1988) (stating
that "these statutes are overbroad because they prevent recovery for medical negligence
and denial of patient choice"). But see Note, Legislative Prohibition of Wrongful Birth
Actions, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1331, 1351 (1987) (although legislative prohibition of
wrongful birth actions is not unconstitutional under Roe v. Wade and its progeny, physi-
cians should compensate plaintiffs for their negligence).
Utah explicitly declares that its state policy is "right to life." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-
11-23 (1987). While Utah's Wrongful Life Act has not yet been put to the test, one
commentator has argued that the law probably cannot withstand a constitutional chal-
lenge. Note, Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life: Analysis of the Causes of Action and the
Impact of Utah's Statutory Breakwater, 1984 UTAH L. REV. 833, 862-63; cf Note, Al-
quijay v. St. Luke's-Roosevelt Hospital: The Inequitable Umbrella of Wrongful Life, 12
J. CONTEMP. L. 137, 148 (1986) ("moral reprehension toward abortion is not a legally
acceptable reason to deny an infant's claim of wrongful life").
130. Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13-15 (Minn. 1986).
131. 396 N.W.2d 10 (Minn. 1986). Mrs. Hickman was 34 years old when she gave
birth to a child with Down's syndrome. Id. at 11. The Hickmans asserted that, had they
known the condition of the fetus, they would have aborted. Id. The parties disputed
whether defendant physician ever offered to conduct an amniocentesis. Id.
132. Id.; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
133. Id. at 13. For a detailed analysis of due process and state action, see J. NOWAK,
R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 421-520 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG].
134. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 14. For a detailed analysis of equal protection, see
NOWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, supra note 133, at 521-801.
135. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 13. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and its progeny
established that a state may not interfere with a woman's right to an abortion during the
first trimester. See also infra notes 148-54 and accompanying text.
136. Hickman, 396 N.W.2d at 18-19 (Amdahl, C.J., dissenting).
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cision-making process is constitutionally impermissible under Roe
and its progeny.' 37
Only one state, Maine, has enacted a statute that allows wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions.' 38 Unfortunately, the statute has not
yet been judicially interpreted;' 39 and the provision that applies to
negligent genetic counseling merely specifies that only special dam-
ages will be awarded. 40 The statute does not make a distinction be-
tween wrongful birth and wrongful life actions.'
IV. A Model Statute
Because courts are generally reluctant to formulate social policy, 142
and also because wrongful birth and wrongful life actions involve con-
troversial issues, 143 many courts have stated that these issues should
be addressed by the legislatures. 14 The gradual recognition of wrong-
The rights under Roe are decisionally based, and subdivision 2 [of Minnesota's
statute prohibiting wrongful birth actions] constitutes an official interference
with the decisionmaking process. While, facially, it is the doctor's conduct
which deprives the woman of the information she needs to make an informed
decision, the deprivation of the information carries with it the imprint of the
state. Roe contemplates that a woman makes an informed decision within the,
setting of the doctor-woman relationship ... and the entry of the state into that
relationship has been found to be constitutionally impermissible under Roe and
its progeny. Subdivision 2 constitutes a subtle entry into that relationship and
interference with the informed decisionmaking process.
Id. at 19 (citation omitted).
137. Id.; see also Wrongful Birth Actions, supra note 29, at 2019-23; cf Ochs v. Bor-
relli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982) ("[p]ublic policy cannot support an
exception to tort liability when the impact of such an exception would impair the exercise
of a constitutionally protected right").
138. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931 (Supp. 1988).
139. The most recent wrongful birth case in Maine was a wrongful conception case,
involving a negligently performed tubal ligation which resulted in the birth of a healthy,
but unplanned, child. See Macomber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810 (Me. 1986).
140. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2931(3) (Supp. 1988). "Damages for the
birth of an unhealthy child born as a result of professional negligence shall be limited to
damages associated with the disease, defect or handicap suffered by the child." Id.
141. See id.
142. See infra notes 144, 147 and accompanying text.
143. The controversy stems from moral issues as much as from legal ones:
Prenatal screening for genetic disabilities raises many possible scenarios: (1) the
sad but understandable choice of women to protect themselves and other family
members from the problems of raising a disabled child; (2) the prospect of bear-
ing a child whom parents fear will lead a lifetime of pain; and (3) the eugenic
specter of mothers as 'stewards of quality control,' aborting fetuses who would
become socially unacceptable, stigmatized people.
REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE 1990s: A BRIEFING HANDBOOK 6 (N. Taub & S. Cohen
ed. 1988) (numbers added).
144. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 251, 512 N.E.2d
691, 702 (1987) ("wrongful life ... should not be recognized in this [s]tate absent clear
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ful birth actions, the general rejection of wrongful life actions, 45 and
the diverse approaches to the determination of recoverable dam-
ages, 146 indicate that public policy in this area is not easily deter-
legislative guidance"); Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 59, 412 N.W.2d 232, 243
(1987) ("the conflicting economic and moral interests are best resolved in the Legisla-
ture"); Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 13 (Minn. 1986) ("we
consider the establishment of wrongful birth or wrongful life suits to be best within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the legislature"); Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 808,
505 N.E.2d 947, 948, 513 N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (1987) ("[t]he argument that public policy is
better served by permitting plaintiff to recover the cost of his son's postmajority ex-
traordinary expenses is more appropriately addressed to the [l]egislature"); Becker v.
Schwartz, 46 N.Y.2d 401, 412, 386 N.E.2d 807, 812, 413 N.Y.S.2d 895, 901 (1978)
("[riecognition of so novel a cause of action requiring, as it must, creation of a hypotheti-
cal formula for the measurement of an infant's damages is best reserved for legislative,
rather than judicial, attention"); Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C. 103, 116, 337 S.E.2d
528, 536 (1985) ("the myriad problems arising from claims for wrongful life and wrongful
birth can be resolved properly only by a legislative body"); James G. v. Caserta, 332
S.E.2d 872, 881 (W. Va. 1985) ("in this jurisdiction, a claim for wrongful life does not
exist in the absence of any statute giving rise to such a cause of action"). But see Gildiner
v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D. Pa. 1978) ("[t]he determi-
nation of the scope of the common law doctrine of negligence is within the province of
the judiciary"); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1208 (Colo. 1988) (en bane) ("in
light of our finding that we are merely applying common law negligence principles and
not 'creating' a new cause of action unknown at common law, we see no reason to defer
the resolution of this issue to the legislature").
145. See supra notes 116-28 and accompanying text.
146. The only aspect that the courts generally agree on is that ordinary childrearing
costs are not recoverable in wrongful birth or wrongful life cases. The currently accepted
approach to damages is that either the parents or the infant may recover the extraordi-
nary medical expenses associated with the infant's disease, but there will be only one
recovery per family. There is much disagreement over whether there should be an award
for postmajority expenses; and there is no uniformity concerning the parents' emotional
distress claim. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 237-40, 643 P.2d 954, 965-66,
182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 347-49 (1982) (deaf infant or her parents could recover extraordinary
medical and educational expenses during minority, and infant could not recover those
expenses upon majority; infant could not recover for emotional distress); Siemieniec, 117
Ill. 2d at 262-63, 512 N.E.2d at 707-08 (parents of infant with hemophilia recovered
extraordinary medical expenses during infant's minority, but not upon majority; no emo-
tional distress award); Procanik, 97 N.J. at 355-56, 478 A.2d at 764 (infant or parents of
infant with congenital rubella syndrome could recover special damages during minority,
and infant could recover those expenses upon majority; infant could not recover for emo-
tional distress; parents could recover for emotional distress but were barred by statute of
limitations); Becker, 46 N.Y.2d at 413-15, 386 N.E.2d at 813-14, 413 N.Y.S.2d at 901-03
(parents of infant with Down's syndrome recovered extraordinary medical expenses but
not emotional distress); Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 477-83, 656
P.2d 483, 492-97 (1983) (parents of infant or infant with fetal hydantoin syndrome could
recover extraordinary expenses during minority and majority; parents could recover emo-
tional distress after offset for emotional benefits of raising child; no emotional distress
award for child) (en bane); Naccash v. Burger, 223 Va. 406, 414-19, 290 S.E.2d 825, 830-
33 (1982) (parents of infant who died of Tay-Sachs disease recovered medical expenses
and emotional distress but not funeral expenses); cf Kingsbury v. Smith, 122 N.H. 237,
241-42, 442 A.2d 1003, 1004-05 (1982) (for analysis of approaches to damages when
healthy child is born in a wrongful conception case); Scheid, Benefits vs. Burdens: The
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mined. 14' Nevertheless, the significance of giving prospective parents
the opportunity to make a private procreative decision cannot be
stressed enough. In light of the Supreme Court's holdings in Griswold
v. Connecticut, 14  Roe v. Wade"' and their progeny, 11° married
couples 15' are entitled to make reproductive choices 52 and a pregnant
woman has the right to have an abortion. 153 This right is constitu-
Limitation of Damages in Wrongful Birth, 23 J. FAM. L. 57 (1984-85) (same). See gener-
ally Comment, The Legal Recognition of Medical Malpractice Tort Claims Based upon
Theories of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life, 15 N.C. CENT. L.J. 274, 279-86 (1985)
(categorizing the various views toward money damages assessments).
147. See, e.g., Wilbur v. Kerr, 275 Ark. 239, 245, 628 S.W.2d 568, 572 (1982) (Dudley,
J., dissenting) (discussing "the lack of a standard by which we determine when to apply
public policy and the lack of a meaningful definition by which we discover what consti-
tutes public policy"). See generally Symmons, Policy Factors in Actions for Wrongful
Birth, 50 MOD. L. REV. 269 (1987) (for analysis of all conflicting policy factors).
148. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
149. 410 U.S. 113 (1973); see also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
150. See, e.g., Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists,
476 U.S. 747 (1986); Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416
(1983); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S.
179 (1973). See also supra note 9 and accompanying text.
151. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965).
152. See id. "[State prohibition of the use of contraceptives] is repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship." Id. The right of procreative freedom
is now a generally accepted principle, subject to certain limitations. See, e.g., Ochs v.
Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d
880, 882 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987); Sherlock v. Stillwater Clinic, 260 N.W.2d 169, 175 (Minn.
1977); Bowman v. Davis, 48 Ohio St. 2d 41, 46, 356 N.E.2d 496, 499 (1976) (per curiam).
In a comprehensive model statute barring interference with reproductive choice, repro-
ductive choice has been defined as:
a. an individual's choice to exercise her constitutional right to the perform-
ance of an abortion to the extent protected by state and federal constitutional
law
b. an individual's choice to exercise her/his constitutional right to be sterilized
or to refuse sterilization to the extent protected by state and federal constitu-
tional law
c. an individual's choice to carry a pregnancy to term
d. an individual's choice to obtain and to use any lawful prescription for drugs
or other substances designed to avoid pregnancy, whether by preventing im-
plantation of a fertilized ovum or by any other method that operates before, at,
or immediately after fertilization
e. an individual's choice to become pregnant through in vitro fertilization, artifi-
cial insemination, or any other procedure.
Gertner, Interference with Reproductive Choice, in REPRODUCTIVE LAWS FOR THE
1990s: A BRIEFING HANDBOOK 233, 243 (N. Taub & S. Cohen ed. 1988).
153. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 153; see also supra note 9 and accompanying text. Although
Roe's explicit holding stated that the abortion decision is to be decided by a pregnant
woman in consultation with her physician, in practice physicians limit their role to out-
lining all the medical risks, benefits and alternatives, leaving the actual decision to the
sole discretion of the pregnant woman. See, e.g., REILLY, supra note 32, at 163-67; cf
Danforth, 428 U.S. at 71-74 (states may not give pregnant woman's spouse or parents
right to veto woman's decision to abort).
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tionally protected under the fundamental right to privacy, 154 and
many courts have since held that public policy supports procreative
choice. 155 While society should not encourage couples to have only
"perfect" children, the choice should remain private.'56 Because par-
ents frequently make medical decisions on behalf of their children, 1
57
only parents should decide whether their child's life would be worth
living with the particular genetic disease. Various personal factors are
involved in these decisions, such as the severity of the genetic disease,
the family's size and economic status, as well as religious, moral, emo-
tional and social considerations.158 Thus, the negligent deprivation of
a couple's opportunity to make an informed reproductive decision is
clearly a wrong for which they should be compensated.
159
In some cases an informed reproductive decision could involve ter-
mination of a pregnancy based on factors other than birth defects-
for example, the sex of the fetus. If, however, the parents brought a
lawsuit (claiming that they wanted a boy instead of a girl and would
have aborted, had they known the fetus was a girl), the offsetting ben-
154. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483-85. "[T]he [f]irst [a]mendment has a penumbra
where privacy is protected from governmental intrusion." Id. at 483.
155. See, e.g., Hartke v. McKelway, 707 F.2d 1544, 1552 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 464
U.S. 983 (1983); Ochs v. Borrelli, 187 Conn. 253, 258, 445 A.2d 883, 885 (1982); Ma-
comber v. Dillman, 505 A.2d 810, 816 n.3 (Me. 1986) (Scolnik, J., concurring in part,
dissenting in part); Troppi v. Scarf, 31 Mich. App. 240, 253, 187 N.W.2d 511, 517 (1971).
156. See, e.g., Procanik, 97 N.J. at 366, 478 A.2d at 770 (Handler, J., concurring in
part, dissenting in part) ("[a]n individual-as distinct from the court-has the right to
determine that 'a defective life is worth less than no life at all' ") (emphasis in original).
One commentator has noted the following:
It is ... wrong for the state to substitute its judgment for that of a child (as
exercised by the child's parents) on whether the child's particular burdens make
existence or nonexistence preferable. The sphere of privacy that protects each
family's decisions about reproduction would crumble if the state could impose a
uniform rule that life is always preferable; indeed, it would be ironic if a woman
enjoyed less protection to avoid bringing a genetically impaired child into the
world than were she to desire abortion for her own sake unconnected with the
well-being of the potential child.
Capron, supra note 4, at 653.
157. See infra note 166.
158. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 360, 478 A.2d 755, 767 (1984) (Handler,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[n]ot only must [parents] deal with the unan-
ticipated shock of discovering that their child is handicapped, but also they must cope
with the belief that but for their failure to decide their child's fate they might have spared
the child a life of affliction"); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 440, 404 A.2d 8, 18 (1979)
(Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("[t]o be denied the opportunity-
indeed, the right-to apply one's own moral values in reaching that [procreative] deci-
sion, is a serious, irreversible wrong"); Zuskar, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing parents'
feelings of mourning and guilt upon birth of handicapped infant).
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efits doctrine160 would nullify their damages claim.
The courts generally recognize that medical practitioners have a
duty to provide parents who seek genetic counseling with accurate
genetic information in order to allow the parents to make an informed
reproductive decision. 161 In most cases the physician's duty should
extend not only to the mother and the fetus, but also to the father,
particularly when he has been involved in the testing and counseling.
A breach of this duty which proximately causes the birth of a geneti-
cally defective child-an event which the parents sought to avoid
through genetic counseling-constitutes a valid negligence claim.
Thus, negligent genetic counseling is ordinary medical malpractice
and genetic counselors should be held liable for their negligence.
1 62
The birth of an infant with genetic birth defects injures parents who
specifically sought to avoid this event by seeking medical advice, and
who will now have greater psychological and financial burdens than
parents of healthy children. The child is injured in that his parents
160. See supra note 95.
161. See supra notes 58-74 and accompanying text.
162. See, e.g., Gildiner v. Thomas Jefferson Univ. Hosp., 451 F. Supp. 692, 696 (E.D.
Pa. 1978) ("recognition of a cause of action for negligence in the performance of genetic
testing would encourage the accurate performance of such testing by penalizing physi-
cians who fail to observe customary standards of good medical practice"); Turpin v. Sor-
tini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 966 n.15, 182 Cal. Rptr. 337, 349 (1982)
("[p]ermitting recovery of these extraordinary out-of-pocket expenses whether the cost is
to be borne by the parents or the child should also help ensure that the available tort
remedies in this area provide a comprehensive and consistent deterrent to negligent con-
duct") (en banc); Lininger v. Eisenbaum, 764 P.2d 1202, 1215 (Colo. 1988) (Mullarkey,
J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) ("it is anomalous to recognize the parents' claim
and deny the child's claim.... denial of the child's claim only serves to immunize negli-
gent conduct"); Haymon v. Wilkerson, 535 A.2d 880, 886 (D.C. Ct. App. 1987) ("[t]o
hold otherwise would in effect 'immunize from liability' the physician providing inade-
quate guidance to persons who would choose to exercise their constitutional right to ter-
minate pregnancy where the child, if born, would suffer from genetic defects");
Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 Ill. 2d 230, 235-36, 512 N.E.2d 691, 695 (1987);
Hickman v. Group Health Plan, Inc., 396 N.W.2d 10, 19 (Minn. 1986) (Amdahl, C.J.,
dissenting) ("[t]he possibility that a doctor will be held responsible for negligent conduct
stands as a safeguard that the woman will be fully informed"); Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J.
421, 432, 404 A.2d 8, 14 (1979); Rogers, supra note 15, at 757. One court has noted that
if physicians are not held liable in wrongful life actions, the financial burden will ulti-
mately fall upon the state:
By deciding that the physician has no responsibility to the child to pay for his or
her extraordinary expenses in an action brought on behalf of the child, we are
shifting that responsibility in many cases to the state, which will have to care for
the child (and the adult, if the child lives) far into the future in the more aggra-
vated cases where other funds are unavailable. The net economic effect of our
holding may be that when the physician fails to give proper information to the
parents, all of the people of the state pay the price.
Proffitt v. Bartolo, 162 Mich. App. 35, 58, 42 N.W.2d 232, 243 (1987).
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never had the chance to decide on his behalf whether life with genetic
defects would be better than not being born at all; indeed, the child
will bear the added burden of his parents' feelings of guilt, sorrow and
perhaps resentment. 163 The injury resulting from the physician's neg-
ligence impacts both parents and infant; therefore, wrongful life ac-
tions should not be barred while wrongful birth actions are
recognized. Because a family will be permitted only one recovery in
any event, there is no danger of double recoveries.164
In addition, the traditional reasons given when rejecting wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions-i.e., life is never an injury and dam-
ages are incalculable165-are not persuasive. Recognition of wrongful
birth and wrongful life actions would not somehow disavow the sanc-
tity of life; rather, it would permit prospective parents to make private
decisions concerning the lives of their future children on behalf of
those children. Quality of life decisions based on individuals' moral
and religious beliefs must remain private.
Furthermore, damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life actions
are no more speculative than in any other medical malpractice case.
A dollar value is not placed on the infant's life; rather, it is placed on
the ordinary expenses of raising a child, the extraordinary medical
expenses associated with the genetic disease, and on emotional dis-
tress-an injury which is never easily calculated.
163. One interesting analysis of the kind of damages caused by negligent genetic coun-
seling has termed the parents' injury "impaired parental capacity" and the infant's injury
"diminished childhood." See Berman v. Allan, 80 N.J. 421, 434-36, 404 A.2d 8, 15-16
(1979) (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). "Through the failure of the
doctors... the parents were given no opportunity to cushion the blow, mute the hurt, or
prepare themselves as parents for the birth of their seriously impaired child. Their injury
is real and palpable." Id. at 439, 404 A.2d at 17-18. The infant's "diminished child-
hood" is explained as follows:
[T]he injury consists of a diminished childhood in being born of parents kept
ignorant of her defective state while unborn and who, on that account, were less
fit to accept and assume their parental responsibilities. The frightful weight of
the child's natural handicap has been made more burdensome by defendants'
negligence because her parents' capacity has been impaired; they are less able to
cope with the extra-heavy parental obligations uniquely involved in providing a
child so afflicted with the unfaltering love, constant devotion and extraordinary
care such as a child specially requires.
Id. at 442, 404 A.2d at 19.
164. While both the parent and the child will be able to recover for emotional distress
damages (offset by enjoyment of the child's life), the parties will not thereby obtain a
double recovery for a single injury. Because parent and child each suffer emotional in-
jury, they are each entitled to a recovery for emotional distress. Furthermore, damages
for medical expenses will not be recovered twice (once by the parents and again by the
child); rather, such expenses will be compensated only once-either to the parents or to
the child. See infra notes 174-77 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 105-06, 114 and accompanying text.
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For the above reasons, this Note suggests that legislation be enacted
to: (1) help guide the courts with these sensitive issues; (2) reinforce
and protect the private reproductive rights of prospective parents; and
(3) deter medical malpractice and encourage due care on the part of
medical practitioners. The following model statute is offered as a
guideline:
Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Medical Malpractice Actions
Arising from Negligent Genetic Counseling.
(1) Definitions.-
(a) A "wrongful birth action" is a medical malpractice action
brought by parent(s) of an infant with genetic birth defects when
the health care practitioner who provided genetic counseling serv-
ices was negligent in providing genetic information and thereby
prevented the parent(s) from making an informed reproductive de-
cision. Both parents, rather than the mother alone, are entitled to
bring suit where the father is a participant in the genetic counseling
and has thus established a physician-patient relationship.
(b) A "wrongful life action" is a medical malpractice action
brought on behalf of an infant with genetic birth defects when the
health care practitioner who provided genetic counseling services
to the infant's parents was negligent in providing genetic informa-
tion and thereby prevented the infant's parent(s) from making an
informed reproductive decision.
(c) "Genetic counseling" is the process by which prospective
parent(s) obtain information concerning genetic disorders from
health care practitioners in order to make informed reproductive
decisions. Genetic counseling refers to both pre-conception and
post-conception counseling. The genetic counseling process in-
cludes: (i) conducting medically-accepted genetic tests on the par-
ent(s) and/or fetus; (ii) communication of the test results from the
genetic counselor to the parent(s); and (iii) communication of the
material risks associated with the genetic disorder and available
alternatives.
(d) "Health care practitioner" refers to anyone who provides ge-
netic counseling, including, but not limited to, physicians, nurses,
hospitals, laboratories, and social workers.
(2) Negligent acts or omissions, by a health care practitioner pro-
viding genetic counseling services, which prevent a prospective
parent(s) from making an informed reproductive decision, are ac-
tionable provided that all the requisite elements of negligence are
established. Such a medical malpractice action is a wrongful birth
action when brought by the parent(s) of an infant with genetic
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birth defects; while a wrongful life action is brought on behalf of
the infant.
(3) For both wrongful birth and wrongful life actions it must be
established by plaintiff that the parent(s) would not have under-
gone or continued the pregnancy if she (they) had been fully and
properly informed.
(4) Recoverable damages in wrongful birth and wrongful life ac-
tions include general damages arising from ordinary childrearing
expenses, and special damages encompassing the extraordinary
medical and educational expenses associated with the infant's par-
ticular genetic disorder. The amount of damages shall be deter-
mined by the trier of fact based upon all the appropriate and
relevant circumstances, including, but not limited to, the severity
of the genetic disease, the type and amount of medical treatment
and special education the child will require, and the child's prob-
able life expectancy. Damages shall be distributed as follows:
(a) Wrongful birth actions: Parents may recover general and
special damages for the duration of the infant's minority. Emo-
tional distress damages are recoverable if deemed appropriate by
the factfinder and may be offset by any benefits the parents will
derive in raising the child.
(b) Wrongful life actions: An infant may recover post-majority
general and special damages. There may be an award for emo-
tional distress in appropriate circumstances to be determined by
the factfinder which may be offset by any benefits of being alive.
The model statute recognizes wrongful birth and wrongful life ac-
tions and is premised on four important policy considerations: (1)
procreative choice is constitutionally protected within the right of pri-
vacy;' 6 6 (2) individuals, not courts, should determine for their chil-
dren whether existence with genetic birth defects is preferable to
nonexistence;1 67 (3) this type of medical malpractice should not go
undeterred; 16 and (4) victims of genetic counseling negligence should
be compensated in accordance with established principles of tort
166. See supra note 9 and accompanying text; see also supra notes 148-59 and accom-
panying text.
167. See supra notes 156-59 and accompanying text. An informative analogy can be
made to cases involving medical care for children. Parental decision making for a child's
medical care is traditionally respected by the courts. See, e.g., Bowen v. American Hosp.
Assoc., 476 U.S. 610, 647 (1986) (law requiring treatment of handicapped infants over
parental objections held invalid); Weber v. Stony Brook Hosp., 60 N.Y.2d 208, 212-13,
456 N.E.2d 1186, 1188, 469 N.Y.S.2d 63, 65 (stranger to family of infant with spina
bifida and serious complicating disorders could not override parents' refusal to subject
infant to surgery), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1026 (1983).
168. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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law. 169
The first two sections of the model statute set forth definitions and
the required elements of a cause of action. The third section relates to
cause in fact 70 and is intended to prevent frivolous claims. If the
parents of the genetically impaired child would not have sought an
abortion in any event, then they do not have a cause of action. The
standard to be applied by the jury should be that of a reasonable per-
son in the plaintiff's position-with the same religious, ethical, emo-
tional and financial background, to the extent that those factors can
be determined.17'
The fourth section of the model statute addresses the problem of
recoverable damages. Most courts have held that ordinary childrear-
ing expenses are not recoverable 72 because the parents were planning
to have a child anyway. What they did not intend and actually
sought to avoid, however, was the birth of a child with genetic birth
defects. Because the parents would have terminated the pregnancy or
would not have conceived if they had known of the genetic defects, all
childrearing expenses should be recoverable including extraordinary
medical expenses associated with the infant's disease such as special
education, medical treatments and physical therapy.
But for the medical practitioner's negligence, there would be no
child to raise at all; and under traditional tort principles, damages are
intended to restore an injured person as nearly as possible to the posi-
tion he or she would have been in had the wrong not occurred.173 The
same damages should not be recovered again, however, by the in-
fant. 174 Because parents are responsible for the support of their chil-
dren until the age of majority, it is appropriate to award damages to
169. See supra note 57 and accompanying text; infra note 173 and accompanying text.
170. See supra note 88 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 88-90 and accompanying text.
172. See supra note 146 and accompanying text.
173. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 901 comment a (1979). See
also Robak v. United States, 658 F.2d 471, 478-79 (7th Cir. 1981) ("[i]t is a fundamental
tenet of tort law that a negligent tort feasor is liable for all damages that are the proxi-
mate result of his negligence .... These expenditures must include the costs of raising a
normal child, for the Robaks would not have had to bear them but for defendant's
negligence").
174. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 966, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337, 348 (1982) (holding that either parents or child could recover extraordinary medical
expenses necessary to treat child's ailment) (en banc); Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 351,
478 A.2d 755, 762 (1984) ("[r]ecovery of the cost of extraordinary medical expenses by
either the parents or the infant, but not both, is consistent with the principle that the
doctor's negligence vitally affects the entire family") (citation omitted); Harbeson v.
Parke-Davis. Inc.. 98 Wash. 2d 460. 481. 656 P.2d 483. 495 (1983) (en banc).
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the parents for the infant's minority." 5 The post-majority expenses
should be awarded directly to the infant because parents are not le-
gally obligated to support children beyond the age of minority.
176
The parents should hold the post-majority award in trust for the
child; in many cases, of course, it is likely that the child will continue
to live with his parents for his entire life.177
The damages section gives the jury considerable freedom in making
an appropriate damages award. While there have been many judicial
approaches to damages, 7 1 the most equitable approach is to let the
trier of fact make the determination in view of all the relevant circum-
stances, such as the severity of the disease, 179 life expectancy of the
child, costs of medical treatments for the specific disease, costs of spe-
cial education for the child, the parents' economic status, and the
number of other dependents. 80 Because jurors are often asked to cal-
culate the dollar value of injuries resulting from medical malpractice,
a jury award in wrongful birth and wrongful life suits is appropriate
and no more speculative than in ordinary malpractice cases.
Whether damage for emotional distress should be awarded would
again be determined by the factfinder according to the relevant cir-
175. See, e.g., Harbeson, 98 Wash. 2d at 479, 656 P.2d at 495.
176. Compare Bani-Esraili v. Lerman, 69 N.Y.2d 807, 808, 505 N.E.2d 947, 948, 513
N.Y.S.2d 382, 383 (1987) (parents of infant with Cooley's anemia could recover expenses
for child's medical treatment during minority only) with Procanik v. Cillo, 97 N.J. 339,
352, 478 A.2d 755, 762 (1984) (infant or parents of infant with congenital rubella syn-
drome could recover medical expenses during minority and infant could recover those
expenses during majority).
177. In Robak v. United States, 503 F. Supp. 982, 983 (N.D. Ill. 1980), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 658 F.2d 471 (7th Cir. 1981), the parties agreed that the damage award
would be placed in a reversionary trust. Id. The court stated that the trust would accom-
plish two desirable purposes in that: (1) the child would be provided for throughout her
life; and (2) because of the severe defects suffered by the child as a result of rubella syn-
drome, she would probably have a shorter life span than that projected by life insurance
tables, thereby reducing her maintenance costs to a lesser amount than the full trust
proceeds. Id. Whatever remained in the trust after the child's death would revert back to
the defendant. Id.
178. See supra note 146.
179. For example, in Turpin, the infant plaintiff's genetic birth defect was hereditary
deafness and the court noted that a jury would not evaluate this type of injury in the same
manner as a more debilitating disease such as Tay-Sachs disease. Turpin, 31 Cal. 3d at
235, 643 P.2d at 962-63, 182 Cal. Rptr. at 345-46. But cf Siemieniec, 117 Ill. 2d at 242-
45, 512 N.E.2d at 698-99 (rejecting cause of action for wrongful life because it would
require courts to classify the types of genetic birth defects that are actionable from those
that are nonactionable).
180. See infra notes 182-83. It has been suggested that wrongful birth statutes should
explicitly state that parents are not required to mitigate damages by putting the child up
for adoption or institutionalizing him. Note, The Injury of Birth: Minnesota's Statutory
Prohibition of Postconception Negligence Actions, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 701, 755
n.245 (1988).
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cumstances.' 8 l The jury should specifically consider the psychologi-
cal impact on the parents and their perceived ability to cope with the
physical, emotional and financial hardships.'82 As to the child's emo-
tional distress, the jurors should consider how much pain or suffering
the child endures, and whether life in such an impaired state is really
better than nonexistence. Again, jurors often compute the monetary
value of pain and suffering and emotional distress; thus there is no
reason why it would be inappropriate for wrongful birth and wrongful
life claims.
Furthermore, the damage awards may be offset by the benefits that
the parents will receive in raising the child and by the benefits the
child receives from living, if deemed appropriate by the jury." 3 Most
children, whether or not born with genetic birth defects, provide joy
to their parents; certainly children with only mild birth defects can
derive a great deal of joy from life. In the wrongful birth scenario,
181. Because it is foreseeable that the birth of a child with genetic defects will cause the
parents considerable emotional trauma, see supra notes 11-12, parents ought to be
awarded damages for emotional distress. See, e.g., Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp.,
117 Ill. 2d 230, 270, 512 N.E.2d 691, 711 (1987) (Simon, J., concurring in part, dissent-
ing in part). Justice Simon noted the following:
[I]t is patently foreseeable that [the] birth of a child so afflicted, after the parents
based the decision not to abort on the doctor's inaccurate assurance that the
risk was very low, could result in emotional trauma to the parents. The mea-
surement of damages for this type of emotional distress is no more difficult than
in cases where the emotional distress has been intentionally inflicted or negli-
gently inflicted on a person within the zone of physical danger.
Id.; see also supra note 93 and accompanying text. There is a divergence of opinion as to
whether a jury can competently assess damages for emotional distress in genetic counsel-
ing malpractice actions. Compare Harbeson v. Parke-Davis, Inc., 98 Wash. 2d 460, 475,
656 P.2d 483, 493 (1983) (jury should calculate parents' emotional injury and offset by
countervailing emotional benefits attributable to child's birth) (en banc) with Procanik v.
Cillo, 97 N.J. 339, 354, 478 A.2d 755, 763 (1984) (infant's claim for emotional distress is
too speculative and "would stir the passions of jurors about the nature and value of life,
the fear of non-existence, and about abortion").
182. See, e.g., Turpin v. Sortini, 31 Cal. 3d 220, 239, 643 P.2d 954, 965, 182 Cal. Rptr.
337, 348 (1982) (en banc) (" '[w]hile the law cannot remove the heartache or undo the
harm, it can afford some reasonable measure of compensation toward alleviating the fi-
nancial burdens' ") (quoting Gleitman v. Cosgrove, 49 N.J. 22, 49, 227 A.2d 689, 703
(1967) (Jacobs, J., dissenting)); Procanik, 97 N.J. at 360, 478 A.2d at 766 (Handler, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part). "[P]arents [of handicapped infants] may har-
bor negative feelings of disbelief, fear, anger, inferiority or rejection that are difficult to
express. They may fear being unable to handle their children's handicaps and that the
child may be a burden, especially to a normal sibling." Id. (citation omitted); see also
supra notes 11-12.
183. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920 (1977); see also Procanik, 97 N.J.
at 368, 478 A.2d at 771 (1984) (Handler, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)
("when the burden outweighs the benefits, the difference between the burden of life with
defects and the benefits of that impaired existence can be the measure of damages"); supra
note 95.
WRONGFUL BIRTH ACTIONS
however, parents often experience grief, remorse and guilt because
they specifically sought to spare their child's suffering by preventing
his birth.'84
V. Conclusion
Wrongful birth and wrongful life actions arising from negligent ge-
netic counseling are valid medical malpractice actions. The medical
practitioner offering the genetic counseling services has a duty to re-
port accurate genetic information to the parents to allow the parents
to make an informed reproductive decision. Procreative self-determi-
nation is constitutionally protected and is an extremely important pri-
vate right. The deprivation of the opportunity to make an informed
reproductive decision may have serious, and even tragic, conse-
quences. Although there are many different types of genetic birth de-
fects, some of the more debilitating diseases cause severe grief, shock
and guilt as well as financial burdens to unsuspecting parents. Be-
cause the parents specifically sought to avoid these hardships by seek-
ing the genetic counselor's advice, any breach of the medical
practitioner's duty to the parents and child should result in liability.
Imposing liability on genetic counselors is consistent with existing
tort law because plaintiffs are required to show every element of negli-
gence before a physician can be held liable. Requiring genetic coun-
selors to provide the material risks of genetic birth defects will
preserve parents' right to determine whether they will have children;
and public policy favors family planning. In addition, this kind of
liability exposure may deter medical malpractice by ensuring that all
health care practitioners, hospitals and laboratories implement their
own rigorous rules, regulations and procedures concerning genetic
counseling and diagnostic testing.
Anti-abortion sentiment should not give rise to legislation barring
wrongful birth and wrongful life actions. Griswold, Roe, and other
184. See supra notes 156-63, 182-83; see also Gallagher v. Duke Univ., 852 F.2d 773,
776-77 (4th Cir. 1988). In Gallagher, Mr. and Mrs. Gallagher sought genetic counseling
after their first child suffered from severe, multiple birth defects. Id. at 774-75. Mrs.
Gallagher specifically informed her doctor that she did not wish to conceive unless she
had a normal chance of giving birth to a healthy child. Id. at 779. After the doctor
determined that the first child's chromosomes reflected no genetic abnormalities, the Gal-
laghers conceived a second child who was also born with severe, multiple birth defects.
Id. at 775. Because the child was profoundly impaired and because no evidence of bene-
fits of parenthood was introduced, the court held that the jury had not been required to
offset the extraordinary costs of caring for the child by any benefits. Id. at 776-77. The
court also held that the jury's verdict of $1,031,000 was neither speculative nor conjec-
tural. Id. at 777. In addition, the court affirmed the award of emotional distress damages
to both mother and father. Id. at 779.
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Supreme Court cases hold that procreative choice is every individual's
private right. Other states should follow Maine's lead by enacting
legislation recognizing the validity of wrongful birth and wrongful life
actions, to ensure that such private reproductive rights are protected.
Juries are capable of determining the impact of a seriously handi-
capped child upon a family and reflecting that impact in their calcula-
tion of damages. If the child's genetic defect is slight, the jury award
will be comparatively low. If, however, the genetic disease is so severe
that the child and parents will endure much psychological and finan-
cial suffering, there should be larger compensatory damages. Because
the circumstances of genetic counseling malpractice actions can vary
widely, the most equitable result will be reached through a jury ver-
dict. In this manner, the damage award can be tailored to meet the
particular needs of the plaintiffs. Although money is poor compensa-
tion for the parents' distress and the child's life of affliction, it is the
only remedy the law provides; it will also help to relieve some of the
heavy financial burden parents must bear so that they can begin ad-
justing to the monumental responsibility of raising a handicapped
child.
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